混合所有制改革与最优专利授权--基于不对称信息的寡头博弈  

Mixed-ownership reform and optimal licensing:Oligopoly game with information asymmetry

作　　者：叶光亮 王世强[2] 陈逸豪 YE Guang-liang;WANG Shi-qiang;CHEN Yi-hao(Hainan University,Haikou 570228,China;Institute of Economics,China Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100836,China;Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)

机构地区：[1]海南大学,海口570228 [2]中国社会科学院经济研究所,北京100836 [3]中国人民大学,北京100872

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2019年第11期54-68,共15页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71773129;71273270);国家“万人计划”青年拔尖人才支持计划资助项目(W02070290);青年长江学者奖励计划资助项目(Q2016037);中国人民大学科学研究基金(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金)资助项目(14XNI006;18XNQ020;19XNQ045).

摘　　要：混合所有制改革过程中,公有企业引入民营资本对技术创新传播、产业发展以及社会福利状况产生的影响,是评估改革效果的重要因素.基于不对称信息混合寡头模型,从专利授权角度讨论部分民营化对企业技术推广决策及社会福利的影响.研究表明,在排他性合约、分离合约和混同合约3种合约类型中,前两者更受公有专利持有者青睐.民营化程度更高的专利持有者为提升资本增值能力,更倾向于排他性合约;授权方式上更倾向于特许权收费,而不是固定收费.民营化比例选取不当,将无法引导企业内生选择社会最优的技术传播路後.从技术传播角度,对理解民营资本在混合所有制改革中的作用,合理推进混合所有制改革,促进产业发展提供了新的分析视角.This paper studies the optimal licensing scheme for a partially privatized public innovator under information asymmetry.It is confirmed that the separating contract strictly dominates the pooling contract for any level of partial privatization.Compared to the excluding contract,the separating contract is superior and emerges as the ultimate equilibrium when the privatization ratio is low;otherwise,the excluding contract becomes the ultimate equilibrium.Given the optimal contract,the public innovator is more likely to prefer a fixed fee when the privatization ratio is relatively small,but is more likely to prefer a royalty when the privatization ratio becomes large.From the perspective of welfare,the separating contract is often associated with the highest social welfare,while the excluding contract never yields the highest social welfare.

关 键 词：最优专利授权 公有企业 部分民营化 不对称信息中 

分 类 号：P062.9[天文地球]