信用担保与下侧风险控制下零售商资金约束供应链订货与定价策略  

The ordering and pricing strategies of supply chain with a capital constrained retailer under credit guarantee and downside risk control

作　　者：张川[1] 樊灵伟 田雨鑫 张红晨 ZHANG Chuan;FAN Ling-wei;TIAN Yu-xin;ZHANG Hong-chen(School of Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110169,China)

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院

出　　处：《控制与决策》2019年第12期2698-2707,共10页Control and Decision

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71271051);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(N140607001)

摘　　要：针对供应商、零售商和商业银行组成的供应链系统,考虑当零售商面临资金约束时,通过供应商信用担保贷款模式缓解零售商资金约束对供应链总体利润的影响.构建零售商和供应商期望利润模型,分别讨论银行风险中性及下侧风险控制下的零售商订货与供应商定价决策,并利用斯坦克尔伯格博弈求解.最后,对供应商担保系数、银行风险容忍系数进行灵敏度分析.研究表明:1)给定担保系数,只有当风险容忍系数小于一定的阈值时,银行下侧风险控制才会影响零售商以及供应商的最优决策;2)给定风险容忍系数,只有当担保系数小于一定的阈值时,供应商担保系数才会影响零售商以及供应商的最优决策;3)银行贷款限额是担保系数、风险容忍系数的严格递增函数.With respect to a supply chain system which consists of a supplier, a retailer and a commercial bank, when the retailer encounters capital constraint, the loan model of a credit guarantee provided by the supplier under bank’s downside risk control can alleviate the impact to supply chain profits. We analyze the optimal order decision of the retailer and the optimal wholesale decision of the supplier in the setting of bank’s risk-neutral and bank’s downside risk control through designing the retailer’s and the supplier’s expected profit model respectively, and solve them by Stackelberg game.Finally, the conclusions are verified by sensitivity analysis of the parameters. The results show that: 1) if the guarantee coefficient is given, only when the risk tolerance coefficient is lower than a threshold, the bank’s downside risk control has an influence on the retailer’s and the supplier’s optimal decisions;2) if the risk tolerance coefficient is given, only when the guarantee coefficient is lower than a threshold, the supplier’s guarantee coefficient has an influence on the retailer’s and the supplier’s optimal decisions;3) the bank’s loan limit is a strict increment function of guarantee coefficient and risk tolerance coefficient.

关 键 词：供应链金融 信用担保 下侧风险控制 资金约束 斯坦克尔伯格博弈 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]