基于政府干预的报废汽车回收博弈模型  

A Game Model for End-of-life Vehicles Recycling Based on Government Intervention

作　　者：朱庆华[1] 李幻云 ZHU Qing-hua;LI Huan-yun(School of Business Management,Dalian University of Technology,Dalian 116024,China)

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学工商管理学院

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2019年第10期33-39,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家重点基础研究发展计划资助项目(2011CB013406);国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(71025002);国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(NSF71033004)

摘　　要：为分析政府干预如何影响当前报废汽车市场的回收效率,分别建立了基于政府补贴、政府规范的博弈模型,并对比分析了补贴前后、规范前后正规回收拆解企业和非正规回收拆解企业的决策。研究结果表明,两种策略对回收市场都有显著的正向导向作用,且受车主对回收价格的敏感度和市场主体之间竞争程度的影响。但当前市场环境下,相较于规范,补贴更有利于回收市场的健康发展。最后,通过数值仿真探讨不同补贴和规范政策对废旧汽车回收率的影响,为政府和汽车回收拆解企业提供有意义的决策依据。In order to analyze the effect of government intervention on the recycling efficiency of end-of-life vehicles, game models are introduced to analyze the game relations between market entities based on government subsidies and government regulations, and then compare the decisions of recycling and dismantling enterprise and black market without and with subsidies or regulations. The results show that the two strategies play significantly positive roles in recycling market, which are influenced by consumer’s environmental awareness and the competition between the entities. However, compared with regulations, subsidies are more conducive to the recycling market in current situation. Further, a numerical simulation is presented to research the effects of subsidies and regulations, which provides some insights into the decision-making of government and enterprises.

关 键 词：政府干预 报废汽车 回收博弈模型 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]