“硬指标”的“软约束”:干部考核“一票否决制”的生成与变异  

“Weak Constraints” of “Hard Indicators”:the Formation and Variation of the “One-vote Veto” Performance Evaluation

作　　者：陈硕 Chen Shuo

机构地区：[1]深圳大学城市治理研究院

出　　处：《四川大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2020年第1期32-42,共11页Journal of Sichuan University：Philosophy and Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目“干部选拔任用中的‘逆淘汰’现象及其治理研究”(17CZZ028);广东省普通高校青年创新人才类项目“基于腐败视角的基层官员‘为官不为’生成机制与治理路径研究”(2018WQNCX149);深圳市哲学社会科学重点项目“深圳营造共建共治共享社会治理格局走在全国最前列研究”(SZ2018A007)

摘　　要："一票否决制"是一项极具威慑力的干部考核手段。"一票否决制"以科层制政府体系、干部人事管理权限及基于目标责任制的分层考核为制度要素,通过将"硬指标"完成情况与地方官员的职业前景挂钩,形成为一种刚性激励措施。然而,强制命令与刚性激励并不总是能够带来高度服从与有效回应。地方官员的"应付性服从型"和"蓄意偏离型"规避策略,以及"硬指标"的无限扩大、内生性缺陷与非正式制度共同导致了"一票否决制"约束力的弱化与政绩激励的扭曲。为消除"硬指标"泛滥的负面影响并化解政绩激励扭曲问题,除清理和规范"硬指标"外,还需从管理思维、行政模式以及干部人事制度建设等方面入手,整体提升干部考核的理性化、科学化和规范化水平。The"One-vote Veto System"is a highly deterrent performance appraisal tool. On the basis of bureaucratic system,the cadre personnel management and the target responsibility system-based hierarchical assessment,the "One-vote Veto System" leads to a hard mode of stimulation by linking the completion of the "Hard Indicators" with the career prospect of local agents. However,mandatory orders and strong incentives do not always lead to a high degree of compliance or effective response. This article discusses officials? two main gaming strategies,i.e. "coping compliance" and "malicious deviance",and indicates that endogenous defects,informal institutions and external disadvantages result in the weakening of the power of the "One-vote Veto System" and the distortion of achievement motivation. To eliminate the negative effects of "Hard Indicators" and thoroughly resolve the problem of distortion of political incentives,we need to start from the aspects of management thinking,management mode and cadre personnel system construction and to thoroughly make the performance appraisal more rational,scientific and normative.

关 键 词：一票否决制 硬指标 干部考核 基层治理 干部人事制度 

分 类 号：D035.2[政治法律—政治学]