国企混改的逻辑、路径与实现模式选择  

LOGIC, PATH AND REALIZATION PATTERN CHOICE OF MIXED REFORM OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

作　　者：郑志刚[1] Zheng Zhigang

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学财政金融学院

出　　处：《中国经济报告》2020年第1期54-67,共14页CHINA POLICY REVIEW

摘　　要：国企改革一直是中国经济体制改革的主要内容。但由于预算软约束、模糊诚信责任、多目标激励冲突和中国式内部人控制等问题的存在,国有企业既没有摆脱"家庭手工作坊式"的控制权对经营权的干预,无法利用社会专业化分工提高效率,也没有很好解决家庭手工作坊并不存在的代理问题。混改作为当下国企改革新的突破口在新一轮国企改革中被普遍采用。国企混改一方面需要在股东层面通过引入盈利动机明确的民资背景的战略投资解决以往的所有者缺位问题;另一方面,通过混改形成主要股东之间的竞争关系,建立一种自动纠错机制,以有效避免大股东一股独大容易导致的监督过度、决策失误和形成对经理人的制约,避免内部人控制问题。The reform of state-owned enterprises has always been the main content of China's economic system reform.However,due to the problems like soft budget constraints,vague honesty responsibilities,multi-objective incentive conflicts and Chinese-style insider control,stateowned enterprises have neither shaken out of the intervention of"family workshop"control right to management right,which were unable to take advantage of social specialization to increase effi ciency,nor have they solved the agency problems that did not exist in family workshops.Mixed reform,as a new breakthrough in the current state-owned enterprise reform,is widely adopted in the new round of state-owned enterprise reform.On the one hand,the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises needs to solve the problem of the absence of previous owners at the shareholder level through the introduction of strategic investment from the private background with a clear profit motive;On the other hand,through the mixed reforms,a competitive relationship between major shareholders will be formed and an automatic error correction mechanism will be established to effectively avoid over-supervision,decision-making errors and restrictions on managers that are easily caused by a dominant shareholder,which will also avoid insider control issues.

关 键 词：国有企业 混合所有制 现代产权理论 分权控制理论 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济]