政府补贴对企业创新绩效的双重作用机制研究——以生物医药上市企业为例  

Research on the Dual Effect Mechanism of Government Subsidy on Enterprise Innovation Performance: A Case Study of Listed Biopharmaceutical Enterprises

作　　者：张永安[1] 严嘉欣 胡佩 Zhang Yongan;Yan Jiaxin;Hu Pei(School of Economics and Management,Beijing University of Technology,Beijing 100124,China)

机构地区：[1]北京工业大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2020年第1期32-39,共8页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目“基于CAS的焦点企业核型结构产业集群创新网络演化机理研究”(70972115);国家部委项目“基于复杂自适应系统的集群创新网络模拟研究”(3A011212200901)

摘　　要：应用2012-2016年中国生物医药上市企业面板数据,提出并验证政府补贴影响企业创新绩效的资源倾向机制及信号传递机制。结果表明,政府补贴能够通过资源倾向机制和信号传递机制促进企业创新绩效的提升,企业研发投入在其中起部分中介作用;政府补贴通过信号传递机制释放的信号,对企业获得银行贷款具有促进作用,但是对机构投资者持股作用不显著;银行贷款和机构投资者持股均能够有效缓解企业创新的融资约束,促进企业创新绩效的提高,两种方式相比,机构投资者持股更有效。Applying the panel data of China Biopharmaceutical listed enterprises in 2012 ~ 2016,the paper proposes and verifies the resource propensity mechanism and signal transmission mechanism of government subsidies affecting the innovation performance of enterprises. The results show that: government subsidies can promote the improvement of enterprise innovation performance through resource orientation mechanism and signal transmission mechanism;enterprise R&D investment plays a part in mediating role;the signals released by the government subsidy through the signal transmission mechanism have a simulative effect on the enterprise obtaining bank loans,but the effect on institutional investors’ shareholding is not significant;Bank loans and institutional investors can effectively alleviate the financing constraints of enterprise innovation and promote the improvement of enterprise innovation performance;holding shares by institutional investors is more effective based on the comparison of the two methods.

关 键 词：政府补贴 创新绩效 生物医药企业 资源倾向机制 信号传递机制 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理]