中期自愿审计、支付策略与年度盈余质量  

Voluntary Interim Auditing,Payment Strategy and Annual Earnings Quality

作　　者：李文颖[1,2] 张雪妍 陈宋生 LI Wenying;ZHANG Xueyan;CHEN Songsheng(School of Management and Economics,Beijing Institute of Technology,Beijing 100081,China;School of Accounting,Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance,Shanghai 201620,China)

机构地区：[1]北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京100081 [2]上海立信会计金融学院会计学院,上海201620

出　　处：《管理科学》2019年第5期113-128,共16页Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71672009,71972011);上海高校青年教师培养资助计划~~

摘　　要：鉴证性信息披露是有效指导资本市场资源配置的重要机制,因而中期自愿审计过程中治理层与管理层的动机博弈和经济后果是国内外学者关注的热点问题。当前中期自愿审计对会计信息质量的影响研究尚未达成一致,结论的差异性除因样本选择区间迥异和自选择偏差外,还可能由于忽视了中期自愿审计具有年度闭合效应。基于中国上市公司中期审计和年度报表两项审计业务多由同一家事务所承接、审计双方在年度内具有连续的行为动机这一事实,通过构建治理层和管理层的行为模型,理论剖析一个完整的会计年度内半年度和年末节点管理层动机变化和企业支付策略选择;运用2001年至2012年中期数据和年度数据,采取Heckman二阶段回归模型、PSM匹配、行业规模匹配等方法规避内生性问题,以实证中期自愿审计的年度效应,解释已有结论的差异;对盈余质量的计量方法和样本区间进行调整以检验结论稳健性。研究结果表明,中期自愿审计通过改变管理层动机,同时改善中期和年度盈余质量,在一个完整会计年度内发挥经济效应;中国上市公司的中期自愿审计增加了年度总审计费用的支出,且中期与年度审计费用的比率与年度盈余质量呈正相关,说明代表治理层审计质量需求大小的支付策略可有效调节中期自愿审计的年度效应。进一步研究表明,持续性中期自愿审计通过改变管理层操控盈余的动机预期,对以后会计年度的盈余质量也有明显的提升功能。研究结果有助于厘清中期自愿审计下管理层激励行为模式和企业支付策略经济后果,丰富并完善了鉴证性信息披露领域理论,中期自愿审计的经济效应结论对未来中期、季度等定期报告的鉴证要求有一定的政策参考价值。Disclosing attested information plays an important role in instructing capital allocation effectively and researchers are paying much attention to voluntary interim auditing,especially to the incentive game between corporate governance layer and managers during the process of voluntary interim auditing,and the economic effect of voluntary interim auditing as well.However,among the current studies,there is still insufficient consistent view about the impact of voluntary interim auditing on accounting information quality.As to the possible reasons,Except for the difference in sample periods,possible self-selection bias in sampling and so on,this paper gives another potential explanation that prior researches are missing——the yearly effect of voluntary interim auditing.Nowadays in China,listed firms almost choose the same audit firms to have their interim and annual financial reports audited,making both auditors and auditees’behavior incentives consecutive in a whole year.Based on this,theoretically this paper constructs a behavior model involving both managers and corporate governance layer to investigate managers’incentive change and clients’auditing payment strategy during a full accounting year.Furthermore,the study employs the interim and annual data over 2001-2012 period and adopts Heckman 2 SLS model,PSM method and size-matched methods to avoid possible endogeneity problem in order to empirically test the yearly effect of voluntary interim auditing and explain researchers’extant differentiate evidences.Finally,this paper constructs robustness tests by changing the measurement of earnings quality and adjusting the sample period.Empirical results show that voluntary interim auditing can exert its economic effect in a full accounting period,that is,voluntary interim auditing can improve both the interim and annual earnings quality by changing managers’earnings manipulation incentives.Moreover,voluntary interim auditing increases the yearly total audit fees and the ratio of interim audit fee to annu

关 键 词：中期自愿审计 审计支付策略 盈余质量 管理层动机 信息披露机制 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]