债权人监督与上市公司盈余管理——基于债务违约风险视角  

Creditor Supervision and Earnings Management of Listed Companies:From the Perspective of Debt Default Risks

作　　者：李诗瑶 李星汉[2] 管超 LI Shi-yao;LI Xing-han;GUAN Chao(Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872;Shenzhen Central Branch of People's Bank of China,Shenzhen 518001,China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学法学院,北京100872 [2]中国人民大学金融与证券研究所,北京100872 [3]中国人民银行深圳市中心支行,广东深圳518001

出　　处：《当代财经》2020年第2期138-148,共11页Contemporary Finance and Economics

摘　　要：利用KMV模型计算出的债务违约风险衡量债权人监督动力,利用2008—2018年A股上市公司的数据,研究了债务违约风险与应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理的关系。研究发现:上市公司债务违约风险越高,其应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理水平越低;相比于国有企业,债权人外部监督对民营企业两种盈余管理的抑制作用更加显著。进一步研究发现:债权人监督能够降低上市公司通过操纵真实盈余管理向下调整利润的程度。This paper makes use of the debt default risks calculated with KMV model to measure the creditors' supervisory power.Then it uses the data of A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2018 to study the relationship between debt default risk and accrued earnings management and real earnings management.The findings show that the higher the debt default risk of a listed company,the lower its level of accrual earnings management and real earnings management will becompared with state-owned enterprises,the external supervision of creditors has a more significant restraining effect on the two types of earnings management of private enterprises.Further research finds that creditor supervision can reduce the degree of downward profit adjustment by manipulating real earnings management in listed companies.

关 键 词：债务违约风险 应计盈余管理 真实盈余管理 

分 类 号：F275.4[经济管理—企业管理]