基于成本显示的成本加激励金合同优化模型  

Pricing Optimization Model of Cost-plus-incentive-fee Contract Based on Cost Revelation in Equipment Acquisition

作　　者：张澄宜 林名驰[1] 谢力[1] ZHANG Cheng-yi;LIN Ming-chi;XIE Li(School of Equipment Economics and Management,Naval University of Engineering,Wuhan 430033,China)

机构地区：[1]海军工程大学装备经济管理系

出　　处：《火力与指挥控制》2020年第1期69-74,共6页Fire Control & Command Control

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目（18BGL287）

摘　　要：成本加激励金合同在装备采办领域广泛应用,但存在供应商虚报成本以增加利润的弊端。为了使供应商提供其真实成本,对合同进行优化设计,提出由供应商制定目标成本而不是由客户制定,并根据目标成本确定目标利润和成本激励系数。模型给出了目标利润、成本激励系数关于目标成本的具体函数,并通过设置利润率上限以及最可能成本时的利润率控制了利润范围。从理论上和案例上论证了供应商在提出其真实预期成本时模型可达到最优激励效果。In the field of equipment acquisition,the cost plus incentive fee contract is commonly used while it has some limitations.To a certain extent,it may cause supplier to overstate cost to increase profits,and ultimately reduce efficiency in the use of funds.To motivate supplier to tell its actual costs,the paper optimizes the cost-plus-incentive-fee contract and proposes that the target cost be set by the supplier rather than the customer,and the target profit and incentive coefficient are set based on the target cost set by the supplier.The model gives the specific function of target profit and incentive coefficient on target cost,and limits the range of profits by setting the upper limit and the specific value at the most likely cost of profit rate.Finally,it is proved in theory and case that the optimal incentive effect can be achieved when the supplier proposes the actual expected cost.

关 键 词：目标利润 成本激励系数 目标成本 成本加激励金合同 成本显示 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]