无实际控制人上市公司高管薪酬粘性探讨  

Research on Executive Compensation Stickiness of Listed Companies without Actual Controllers

作　　者：干胜道 王杭 陈彦琼 GAN Sheng-dao;WANG Hang;CHEN Yan-qiong

机构地区：[1]四川大学商学院 [2]武汉大学财务部

出　　处：《改革》2020年第3期150-159,共10页Reform

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“上市公司员工收入与资本回报财务公平测度研究”(13BJY015)。

摘　　要：在对高管薪酬业绩敏感性、高管薪酬粘性及其影响因素进行理论回顾和分析的基础上构建模型,采用我国沪深A股无实际控制人上市公司2008-2018年的数据作为研究样本进行实证研究。研究发现:我国无实际控制人上市公司高管薪酬与企业业绩呈正相关关系;无实际控制人上市公司存在高管薪酬粘性;无实际控制人上市公司股权集中度的提升有助于抑制高管薪酬粘性,但独立董事规模或监事会规模扩大对高管薪酬粘性的影响不明显。我国企业在无实际控制人的情况下为了抑制高管薪酬粘性,不仅需要机构投资者发挥"股东积极主义"的治理作用,强化对高管"薪酬与业绩"关系的质询机制,而且需要从证券监管部门、司法部门、新闻媒体等方面引入更有效的外界监督机制。This paper theoretically reviews and analyzes executive compensation performance sensitivity, executive compensation stickiness and its impacts. Based on that, we establish model and select a-share listed companies without actual controllers in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from the year 2008 to 2018 as the research sample. The research shows:(1)In listed companies without actual controllers in China, executive compensation is positively correlated with company performance;(2)Executive compensation stickiness exists inlisted companies without actual controllers in China;(3)The improved concentration ratio of shares has a positive effect on controlling executive compensation stickiness, but the enlargement of independent directors or board of supervisors can’t effectively control executive compensation stickiness. Based on the research conclusions, in order to control executive compensation stickiness,China’s listed companies without actual controllers need institutional investors to play an active role of"Shareholder Activism", which could strengthen the inquiry mechanism of the relationship between executive pay and performance. Besides, it is need to introduce more effective external supervision mechanism such as securities regulatory department, judicial department and news media etc.

关 键 词：无实际控制人 高管薪酬粘性 企业业绩 委托代理问题 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]