考虑员工疲劳行为的生产-库存优化与协调  

Production-inventory Optimization and Coordination Considering Employee Fatigue Behavior

作　　者：伏开放 周国林 李英俊 Fu Kaifang;Zhou Guolin;Li Yingjun(School of Business Administration,Guangdong University of Finance,Guangzhou 510521,China)

机构地区：[1]广东金融学院工商管理学院,广东广州510521

出　　处：《物流技术》2020年第2期88-92,共5页Logistics Technology

基　　金：广东省哲学社会科学规划项目(GD18XGL20);广东省自然科学基金资助项目(1714050004745);广东省普通高校人文社科重点研究基地项目(2018WZJD007);广东省科技金融重点研究基地项目(2014B030303005);广东省普通高校青年创新人才类项目(2018WQNCX125,2018WQNCX277)。

摘　　要：研究员工存在疲劳时的生产库存优化与协调问题,构建了员工存在疲劳行为时的库存变化曲线,引入疲劳强度,描述了生产率随时间的变化关系,建立了OEM供应商与OEM品牌商之间的Stackerberg博弈模型,给出了生产库存系统优化与协调的条件。研究结果,表面需求疲软可以削弱双边际化效应,Stackerberg博弈的领导者利润并不一定高于跟随者利润。This paper studies the production-inventory optimization and coordination problem when employee fatigue is considered,and constructs the inventory change curve when employees have committed fatigued behaviors.Then,after introducing the concept of fatigue intensity,it describes the change of productivity over time,establishes the Stackerberg game model between OEM suppliers and OEM brands,and presents the conditions for the optimization and coordination of the production-inventory system.According to the study,weak surface demand can weaken the double marginalization effect,and the profit of the leader in the Stackerberg game is not necessarily higher than that of the follower.

关 键 词：员工疲劳 生产-库存 协调 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]