控制权激励、公益性捐赠与企业风险承担  被引量:7

On Control Incentive, Public Welfare Donation and Company Risk-Taking

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作  者:吴良海 王玲茜 WU Lianghai;WANG Lingxi

机构地区:[1]安徽工业大学商学院,安徽马鞍山243032

出  处:《南京工业大学学报(社会科学版)》2020年第1期80-100,112,共22页Journal of Nanjing Tech University:Social Science Edition

基  金:国家社会科学基金后期资助项目“现代企业公益性捐赠财务效应的实现路径研究”(19FJYB023);安徽省省级重大教学改革研究项目“大数据环境下财会类专业‘决策有用’信息提供能力的提升途径与Stata实现”(2017jyxm0155)。

摘  要:以2010-2016年中国沪深A股上市公司数据为研究样本,基于代理问题视角,运用多元回归的方法,深入分析控制权激励、公益性捐赠与企业风险承担三者之间的关系。研究发现:公益性捐赠抑制了企业的风险承担水平;控制权激励显著调节了公益性捐赠对企业风险承担水平的抑制作用;公益性捐赠抑制企业风险承担水平的作用在国有企业中更加显著,但控制权激励在公益性捐赠抑制企业风险承担水平的调节作用中并没有表现出显著的产权性质差异;无论是经济上行期,还是经济下行期,公益性捐赠对企业风险承担水平的抑制作用以及控制权激励的调节作用均存在。结果表明,公益性捐赠可能弱化企业主动承担风险的意愿,但良好的公司治理机制可以在一定程度上改善这种弱化作用,由此进一步彰显了强化公司治理、推进现代企业制度建设与市场化改革的重要性与紧迫性。This paper selects the data of the listed companies in China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from 2010 to 2016 as research samples. Based on the perspective of agency problem,the method of multiple linear regression is used to analyze the relationship between public welfare donation and company risk-taking. The results are as follows: Public welfare donation inhibits the risk-taking level of company;Control incentive helps to improve the suppression of public welfare donation on level of company risk-taking;The effect of public welfare donation on suppressing company risk-taking levelis more significant in state-owned enterprises,but the role of control incentive does not show significant difference in the nature of property rights. Whether it is in the economic upswing or the economic downturn,the suppression of company risk-taking level by public welfare donation and the regulation of control incentives both exist.The research in this paper shows that public welfare donation may weaken the willingness of company to take risks,but good company governance mechanisms can improve this weakening to a certain extent,which further emphasizes the importance and urgency of strengthening company governance and promoting modern enterprise system construction and market-oriented reform.

关 键 词:控制权激励 公益性捐赠 盈利能力 企业风险承担 产权性质 经济周期 

分 类 号:F275.1[经济管理—企业管理]

 

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