客户股权集中度与供应商关系专有资产投入——来自上市公司核心客户的经验证据  

Customer Ownership Concentration and Supplier Relationship-specific Assets Investment--Empirical Evidence from Key Customers of Listed Companies

作　　者：王勇[1] WANG Yong(School of Economics and Management,China University of Petroleum(East China),Qingdao 266580,China)

机构地区：[1]中国石油大学(华东)经济管理学院,山东青岛266580

出　　处：《财经论丛》2020年第2期64-74,共11页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71472096);山东省社会科学规划研究项目(19BYSJ42);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(19CX05026B).

摘　　要：本文通过上市公司(供应商)与其上市客户的数据匹配,理论分析与实证考察客户股权集中程度对供应商关系专用资产投入的影响。研究发现,随着客户股权集中度的上升,供应商关系专用资产投入显著下降,支持股权集中引发的大股东"掏空效应"。进一步分析发现,随着客户大股东两权分离度的上升,股权制衡程度下降,以及供应商议价能力下降与地理距离增加带来的监督难度增加,上述负向影响表现得更为显著,表明客户股权集中引发的大股东代理问题("掏空效应")抑制了供应商关系专用资产投入。From the perspective of the supplier,this paper matches the data of listed companies and their listed customers,examines the impact of listed customers’ownership concentration on the relationship-specific assets investment of the supplier corporation.It is found that the relationship-specific assets investment level of the supplier corporation decreases significantly with the increase of the customer ownership concentration.Further analysis shows that the above impact becomes more significant when the customers have a higher separation rate between the control right and the cash flow right and a lower degree of equity checks and balances,and when the suppliers have a lower bargaining power and greater difficulty in supervision caused by geographical distance.The above findings indicate that customers’ownership concentration has caused its major shareholders’agency problem(tunneling effect)and has led supplier corporations to reduce their relationship-specific assets investment.

关 键 词：核心客户 股权集中度 代理问题 关系专用资产 供应链关系 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]