管理层权力会影响银行贷款契约吗  

Will Managerial Power Affect Bank Loan Contracts?

作　　者：闫焕民[1] 张燕华 李瑶瑶 YAN Huan-min;ZHANG Yan-hua;LI Yao-yao(Nanchang University,Nanchang 330031;Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081,China)

机构地区：[1]南昌大学经济管理学院,江西南昌330031 [2]中央财经大学会计学院,北京100081

出　　处：《当代财经》2020年第3期126-136,共11页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“审计师工作压力与审计质量:基于个体感知视角的研究”(71662021);江西省高校人文社会科学研究项目“团队协同视阈下审计任期动态管理行为及结果研究”(JJ19217)。

摘　　要：利用2007—2017年我国A股上市公司的数据,考察了公司管理层权力与银行贷款契约的关系。研究发现:公司管理层权力越大,越会显著降低银行贷款规模,且越难获取银行长期贷款越难;市场化发展水平能缓解管理层权力对银行贷款契约的负面影响。进一步研究发现:公司管理层权力越大,越会提高公司经营风险和降低公司偿债能力及盈余信息质量,导致银行提高授信条件;公司管理层异质性、股权结构、政府干预水平、法制建设水平对管理层权力与银行贷款契约的关系具有调节作用。By making use of the data of China’s A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017,this paper examines the relationship between corporate managerial power and bank loan contracts.The results show that the increase of managerial power will significantly reduce the size of bank loans,and the access to bank long-term loans would be more difficult.The level of marketization development can effectively alleviate the negative effect of management power on bank loan contracts.The extended analysis finds out that the greater the power of the company’s managers,the higher the company’s operating risks,and the lower the company’s solvency and the quality of earnings information,which would lead banks to raise the credit conditions.The heterogeneity of company management,the ownership structure,the level of government intervention and the level of rule of law all have a certain moderating effect on the relationship between the managerial power and bank loan contracts.

关 键 词：市场化发展 管理层权力 银行贷款契约 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]