基于信誉的双渠道供应链合作博弈研究  

Cooperation Game of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Based on Trust Reputation

作　　者：刘峥[1,2] 余明阳[2] 郑兴有[3] 何江 LIU Zheng;YU Mingyang;ZHENG Xingyou;HE Jiang(School of Management Studies,Shanghai University of Engineering Science,Shanghai 201620,China;Antai College of Econmics and Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200240,China;School of Management,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China;School of Economics and Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China)

机构地区：[1]上海工程技术大学管理学院,上海201620 [2]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200240 [3]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433 [4]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092

出　　处：《东华大学学报（自然科学版）》2020年第1期148-155,共8页Journal of Donghua University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家社科基金青年资助项目(18CGL015)。

摘　　要：针对实体与网络渠道合作中存在的渠道信任问题,构建实体渠道主导下两者基于信誉的双渠道合作博弈模型,并在限定周期内对信誉值、销量、利润、抽查次数、作假次数等指标进行仿真分析。结果发现:当网络零售商难以选择实体零售商时,实体零售商对网络零售商信任降低,会通过惩罚权力对网络零售商加以控制,这将招致网络零售商弄虚作假来提高销量及利润;相反,当网络零售商可以自由选择实体零售商时,竞争机制得以有效发挥,并提升实体零售商对网络零售商的信誉感。Aiming at the channel trust problems existing in the cooperation between entity channels and online channels,this paper constructs a dual-channel cooperation game model based on reputation under the dominance of entity channels,and conducts a simulation analysis on indicators such as reputation value,sales volume,profit,spot check times and fraud times within a limited period.The results show that when it is difficult for the online retailer to choose a entity retailer,entity retailers have lower trust in online retailers and will control online retailers through punishment power,which will lead online retailers to resort to fraud to increase sales and profits.On the contrary,when online retailers are free to choose entity retailers,the competition mechanism can play an effective role and promote the reputation of entity retailers to online retailers.

关 键 词：双渠道 合作博弈 信誉 

分 类 号：F270.7[经济管理—企业管理]