市场竞争下企业股权融资的供应链模型分析  

Supply chain modeling analysis of enterprise equity financing under market competition

作　　者：王宇[1] 于辉[2] WANG Yu;YU Hui(School of Management,Chongqing University of Technology,Chongqing 400054,China;School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400030,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆理工大学管理学院,重庆400054 [2]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2020年第1期113-126,共14页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571024,71872021);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2018CDJSK02XK17);重庆理工大学科研启动基金资助项目.

摘　　要：股权融资是企业在市场竞争中抢占市场份额、实现跨越式发展的重要融资途径,企业融资决策的制定必须考虑产品市场上企业间的竞争行为.构建了双寡头零售商的股权融资模型,探讨零售商采取股权融资进行市场开拓时,市场竞争对其股权融资决策的作用机理.核心的发现是:零售商的股权融资应考虑不同成长性下市场竞争的直接和间接影响,市场竞争抑制(促进)了低成长性(高成长性)零售商的股权融资.供应商参与博弈后,零售商的融资策略取决于不同初始市场规模和成长性下的市场竞争与市场开拓之间的权衡.Equity financing has become an important financing channel for enterprises to seize market share and achieve leap-forward development in market competition.The formulation of financing decisions must consider the competition behavior among enterprises in the product market.The paper constructs an equity financing model considering market competition for duopoly retailers,and investigates the mechanism of the competition for equity financing decision when one of the retailers adopts equity financing for market development.Results show that the retailer's equity financing should consider the direct and indirect effects of market competition under different retailer growths;market competition inhibits(promotes)equity financing of low-growth(high-growth)retailers.When the supplier participates in the game,the retailer*s financing strategy depends on the trade-off between market competition and market development under different initial market sizes and growths.

关 键 词：股权融资 市场竞争 市场开拓 博弈理论 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]