商业信用治理非效率投资中的管理者效应  

Managerial Effects in Trade Credit Governing Inefficient Investment

作　　者：唐建荣 汪晗 TANG Jian-rong;WANG Han(School of Business,Jiangnan University,Wuxi 214122,China)

机构地区：[1]江南大学商学院,江苏无锡214122

出　　处：《哈尔滨商业大学学报（社会科学版）》2020年第2期116-128,共13页Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金“小样本非等距灰色预测模型建模及其应用研究”(71301061);江苏省研究生培养创新工程项目“管理者背景特征、商业信用与企业非效率投资”(KYCX18_1887)。

摘　　要：基于管理者能力的视角深入探讨商业信用对非效率投资的治理效应,选取我国沪、深两市2010-2018年A股上市公司为研究对象,运用Richardson残差模型测量非效率投资,采用个体固定效应回归考察了商业信用对非效率投资的治理作用;并运用DEA-Tobit两阶段模型测得管理者能力,进一步研究管理者能力对该治理作用的影响。研究表明,商业信用既能抑制过度投资,也能改善投资不足,实现双向治理效果,且对过度投资的抑制效果更强。同时,该治理作用中存在管理者效应,管理者能力对该治理效应具有积极的促进作用,且在过度投资样本中促进作用更大。Based on the perspective of managerial ability,this paper deeply discusses the governance effect of trade credit on inefficient investment.We selected the A-share companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2010-2018 as the research objects,using the Richardson residual model to measure the inefficient investment,and using the individual fixed effect regression to examine the governance effect of trade credit on inefficient investment.Then we used the DEA-Tobit two-stage model to measure managerial capabilities and further examine the impact of managerial ability on the governance.The results show that trade credit can achieve a two-way governance.It can inhibit overinvestment and improve underinvestment.And there is a stronger inhibitory effect on overinvestment.There is a managerial effect in this governance role,and the managerial ability has a positive effect on the governance effect,and it promotes a greater role in the overinvestment sample.

关 键 词：商业信用 管理者能力 过度投资 投资不足 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F270[经济管理—国民经济]