大学评教“共谋”行为及其治理路径  

The Collusion Behavior of University Teaching Evaluation and its Governance Path

作　　者：蒋贵友 郭丽君 JIANG Gui-you;GUO Li-jun

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学高等教育研究所,上海200062 [2]湖南农业大学教育学院,长沙410128

出　　处：《大学教育科学》2020年第2期105-110,共6页University Education Science

基　　金：国家社科基金“十三五”规划教育学一般课题“大学教师发展视野下的高校教学评价制度研究”(BIA20170209)。

摘　　要：随着高校教学评价的管理主义倾向不断强化,基层教学单位与教师在执行上级组织的评教政策时共同谋划,以应对各项教学检查与突发状况,这种共谋行为并不鲜见。大学评教共谋行为根植于复杂的组织制度环境,它的出现与重复再生是高校制度环境与评教实施之间的不兼容所导致的产物,在很大程度上也是高校集权决策、教学惩治机制强化以及组织制度理性化所导致的非预期结果。然而,这一非正式行为在周期性生发过程中逐渐合法化与制度化,并以不同形式存在于教学评价的各个环节。为此,高校应从外部规范的管理制度与内部平衡的发展机制两个层面来共同构建大学评教运行的有序局面。With the continuously strengthened management tendency of teaching evaluation in higher education institutions,ordinary teaching departments and teachers plan together when they implement the evaluation policies organized by their superior authorities,so as to cope with the endless collusion in various teaching inspections and emergencies.The collusion behavior of teaching evaluation in universities is rooted in the complex organizational system environment.Its emergence and repeated regeneration are the result of the incompatibility between the institutional environment of teaching evaluation and the implementation of teaching evaluation system.Significantly,it is also the unexpected result of the centralized decision-making,the strengthening of teaching punishment mechanism,and the rationalization of the organization system for teaching evaluation.However,this informal behavior is gradually legalized and institutionalized in the process of periodic development,and exists in various aspects of teaching evaluation in different forms.In order to solve the problem of collusion in evaluating teaching,higher education institutions should construct an orderly situation of teaching evaluation system from two aspects,the external standardized management system and the internal balanced development mechanism.

关 键 词：教学评价 共谋现象 制度分析 教学发展 治理路径 

分 类 号：G647[文化科学—高等教育学]