胡塞尔意向逻辑的基本问题  

The basic problem of Husserl’s intention logic

作　　者：毛华威 MAO Huawei(School of Marxism,Jilin Normal University School,Xiping 136000,China)

机构地区：[1]吉林师范大学马克思主义学院,吉林四平13600

出　　处：《重庆理工大学学报（社会科学）》2020年第3期28-34,共7页Journal of Chongqing University of Technology（Social Science）

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目“现代性视域下黑格尔宗教批判思想研究”(17CZJ004)。

摘　　要：胡塞尔的意向逻辑是一种直面与显现"实事本身"的逻辑,它以意识的内在明晰性取代主客二分的思维模式,注重从意识内在性的维度把握"实事本身"的内涵。与西方传统哲学理智型思维逻辑不同,意识与某物的关系构成胡塞尔意向逻辑的基本问题。胡塞尔基于意向逻辑对认识论问题的探讨,不仅揭示出意识的本质性特征,而且还为现代西方认识论哲学的研究提供了新的视域和路径。Husserl’s logic of intention is a logic that faces and manifests the "fact itself",which replaces the dichotomy of subject and object with the inner clarity of consciousness,and focuses on grasping the connotation of "fact itself" from the inner dimension of consciousness. Different from the rational thinking logic of western traditional philosophy,the relationship between consciousness and something constitutes the basic problem of Husserl’s intention logic. Husserl’s discussion on epistemology based on intention logic not only reveals the essential characteristics of consciousness,but also provides a new perspective and path for the study of modern western epistemology philosophy.

关 键 词：胡塞尔 意向逻辑 意向性 意识 认识论哲学 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学]