企业寻租竞争对企业绩效的影响——企业寻租的囚徒困境  

The Influence of Rent-Seeking Competition on Enterprise Performance--The Prisoner’s Dilemma of Enterprise Rent-Seeking

作　　者：刘斐然 胡立君[1] LIU Feiran;HU Lijun(Center for Industrial Economic Research,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073,China)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学现代产业经济研究中心,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《经济经纬》2020年第2期125-133,共9页Economic Survey

摘　　要：利用2000-2017年中国A股上市公司数据,基于竞争视角,重点分析并检验了寻租竞争对企业绩效的影响及其内在机理。研究发现:企业自身的寻租行为可以促进企业绩效,而同一地区企业的寻租竞争则通过抢占政府资源、加重税费负担、降低企业创新水平等内在机理,不仅会抑制企业绩效,而且还发挥负向的调节作用,使企业自身寻租活动的正面效应降低。研究进一步发现:寻租竞争对企业绩效的影响具有异质性,非国有企业和小企业受到寻租竞争的抑制作用更加严重。研究结论在考虑多种因素和使用不同方法检验后依然稳健。企业间的寻租竞争是一种“囚徒困境”式的恶性循环,只有建立公平、透明的市场竞争机制,才能有效遏制寻租竞争。This paper uses the data of China’s listed companies from 2000 to 2017 and focuses on the impact of rent-seeking competition on enterprise performance,and draws the following conclusions.The rent-seeking behavior of enterprise itself can promote enterprise performance,while rent-seeking competition among enterprises not only significantly inhibits enterprise performance,but also plays a moderating effect and makes the profits of enterprise’s rent-seeking activities decline through the internal mechanism of seizing government resources,increasing tax burden,and reducing the innovation level of enterprises.The paper further finds that the impact of rent-seeking competition on enterprise performance is heterogeneous,non-state-owned enterprises and small enterprises’performance are more seriously inhibited by rent-seeking competition.The findings of this paper show that rent-seeking competition among enterprises is a vicious circle of prisoner’s dilemma,and can be effectively restrained only by establishing a fair and transparent market competition mechanism.

关 键 词：寻租竞争 企业绩效 企业寻租 囚徒困境 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]