政治治理、管理层权力与国有企业过度投资  

Political governance,managerial power and over-investment of state-owned enterprises

作　　者：郭宏[1] 李婉丽[1] 高伟伟 GUO Hong;LI Wanli;GAO Weiwei(School of Management,Xi’an Jiaotong University,Xi’an 710049,China;School of Management,Northwestern Polytechnical University,Xi’an 710072,China)

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049 [2]西北工业大学管理学院,陕西西安710072

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2020年第2期71-83,共13页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272241)。

摘　　要：党组织参与公司治理是我国国有上市公司治理的重要特征。本文以2011-2016年国有上市公司为样本,研究了政治治理、高管权力与过度投资的关系。结果表明,管理层权力与过度投资显著正相关,政治治理对管理层权力起抑制效应,减小了管理层权力较大企业过度投资的可能性。党委书记或党委副书记兼任董事、党委书记或党委副书记兼任高管分别对管理层权力与过度投资的正向关系产生抑制效应,而党委书记任董事长与党委书记任总经理的政治治理模式则分别与管理层权力与过度投资的正向关系产生协同效应。分组检验结果表明,地方国有企业中管理层权力与过度投资的正向相关关系较之中央国有企业更为显著,政治治理的对于管理层权力与过度投资关系的抑制作用在中央国有企业中比在地方国有企业中更为显著;在2015年新文件发布之后,管理层权力与过度投资的正向相关关系不再显著,政治治理对管理层权力的抑制效应较新文件发布前更为显著,降低了管理层权力较高的企业过度投资的可能性。The development of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)in China is related to important industries and key areas of the national economy.After experiencing a long period of investment-led economic growth and achieving world-renowned accomplishments,China's economy has entered a new stage of optimizing its economic structure,and the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises has become an important research topic.Due to the existence of“owner absence”and“internal control”in China's state-owned enterprises,the power of top level management(managerial power)has become an important factor affecting investment efficiency.An important feature of China's SOEs that should simultaneously be given attention is,namely,the party committee that participates in corporate governance.How do the members of the party committee and even the party secretary enter the board of directors,or management influence managerial power,and based on that,how should the relationship between managerial power and investment efficiency be adjusted?This paper uses China state-owned listed companies from 2011-2015 as a sample,using the OLS model to study the relationship between political governance,managerial power,and investment efficiency of state-owned listed companies.Richardson's(2006)non-efficiency investment model is used to measure over-investment,and the sum of the control structure and ownership structure is used to measure managerial power;the control structure is based on whether the general manager is a chairman or director as a substitute variable,and the ownership structure is based on the sum of the shareholding ratios of the 2nd-10th largest shareholders/the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder.The party committee secretary can concurrently serve as the chairman of the board of directors or the CEO,or the party secretary or deputy secretary as a director,or the party secretary or deputy secretary as a manager-the five dummy variables serving as substitute variables for political governance.The results of the study s

关 键 词：政治治理 高管权力 过度投资 中央国有企业 地方国有企业 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]