碳税制度下企业产品升级及信息披露策略研究  

Product upgrading and information disclosure decisions in the context of carbon tax

作　　者：许舒婷 缪朝炜[1] 檀哲 上官莉莉 XU Shuting;MIAO Zhaowei;TAN Zhe;SHANGGUAN Lili(School of Management,Xiamen University,Xiamen 361005,China)

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2020年第2期224-230,共7页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71671151、71371158、71711530046)。

摘　　要：在实行碳税制度的背景下,本文构建了包含两家制造商的双寡头模型,以其中一家制造商是否投资产品升级减排作为关键信息,分别研究信息不公开(模型1)和信息公开(模型2)时两家制造商的均衡定价与最优利润以及制造商产品升级的条件,并且进一步研究当制造商同时掌握技术决策权和信息披露权时选择四种不同决策方案的条件。理论结果表明,如果升级后单位实际生产成本变大,制造商选择不升级且不公开;如果升级后单位实际成本变小,当升级后利润增值大于固定成本投入时,制造商选择升级并不公开,反之,选择不升级并公开。无论升级前后单位实际成本大小关系如何,制造商都不会选择升级且公开信息。数值试验部分表明,当制造商同时掌握技术选择权和信息披露权时,碳税是驱动制造商进行升级减排的主要因素,随着碳税的提高,制造商会依次从不升级不公开,不升级公开到升级不公开做决策。当不升级的概率越大时,制造商会在较低的碳税点越早开始升级;当减排努力越大时,制造商会在较高的碳税点才开始升级。Environmental issues have received increasing attention in recent years.Governments in many regions have taken steps to encourage manufacturers to reduce their emissions to protect the environment.Carbon taxes are one common measure designed to reduce carbon emissions in the manufacturing process.A carbon tax,if implemented,would inflate manufacturers’unit production costs,based on the level of emissions generated by the production process–and,consequently,motivate manufacturers to consider upgrading the technology in their facilities to reduce emissions.In a competitive environment,information on manufacturers'technology upgrades has an important impact on competitors'production decisions.This paper focuses on the technology upgrade and information disclosure strategies used among competing manufacturers,in the context of carbon tax,and on the construction of a duopoly model with two manufacturers(M1 and M2)competing simultaneously through game theory.It assumes:M1 does not apply product upgrades and emission reduction technologies,and M2 applies product upgrade and emission reduction technologies.We study the optimal decision-making and profit performance of manufacturers in three different situations.These three situations are M2:only technology choice,only information disclosure,and both technology decision-making and information disclosure.First,the paper separately studies the optimal decision-making and equilibrium performance of the two manufacturers in the case of information asymmetry(model 1)and information disclosure(model 2)when there is a technology choice for M2.In Model 1,product upgrade decision information will not be published for M2,and pricing decisions will be made for M1 based on probabilistic estimate of the upgrade for M2.The results show that when the actual unit cost(sum of unit production cost and unit carbon tax cost)of the upgrade becomes larger,the technology upgrade for M2 will not be carried out;when the actual unit cost of the upgrade becomes smaller,the investment cost will

关 键 词：产品升级 不对称信息博弈 定价策略 碳税 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]