基于促销努力的零售商主导型系统联合促销研究  

On Joint Promotion of Retail-Led System Based on Promotion Efforts

作　　者：孙凡松[1,2] 杨俊 王永龙[3] 蹇明 SUN Fansong;YANG Jun;WANG Yonglong;JIAN Ming(School of Transportation and Logistics,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China;National United Engineering Laboratory of Integrated and Intelligent Transportation,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China;Business School of Chongqing University of Commerce and Industry,Chongqing 400067,China)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学交通运输与物流学院,四川成都610031 [2]西南交通大学综合交通运输智能化国家地方联合工程实验室,四川成都610031 [3]重庆工商大学商学院,重庆400067

出　　处：《综合运输》2020年第3期91-97,119,共8页China Transportation Review

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(18BGL104)。

摘　　要：针对供应链系统中零售商为主导者的情形,构建了基于价格和促销努力敏感的需求函数,分别考察了制造商和零售商投入促销努力时的联合促销问题,分析了促销努力成本分担比例系数对系统成员决策行为和利润的影响通过系统科学理论和仿真分析发现:当零售商投入促销努力时,若制造商分担零售商的促销努力成本比例较小,则制造商和零售商将实现双赢,此时联合促销对二者均有利,反之则制造商的利润将减小;当制造商投入促销努力时,相对于制造商独自承担促销努力成本而言,零售商分担制造商的促销努力成本将会导致制造商利润的减小,而对于零售商而言,若零售商分担制造商的促销努力成本比例较小,则零售商的利润将增加,反之则零售商的利润将减小因此,联合促销在制造商投入促销努力时不是有效的系统策略,在零售商投入促销努力时且制造商分担零售商的促销努力成本比例较小时是有效的系统策略.Aiming at the situation where retailer is dominant in the Supply chain system, this paper constructs a demand function based on price and promotion effort sensitivity, and examines the joint promotion problem when manufacturer or retailer invest in promotional effort. This paper analyzes the influence of the cost sharing coefficient of sales promotion effort on the decision behavior and profit of manufacturer and retailer. Through theoretical and simulation analysis, it is found that: when retailer invests in promotional effort, if manufacturer shares a small proportion of the cost of retailer’s promotional effort, manufacturer and retailer will achieve a win-win situation, and joint promotion will be beneficial to both of them. Otherwise, the manufacturer’s profit will be reduced;when manufacturer invests in promotional effort, retailer shares the costs of promotional effort of manufacturer, which will lead to the reduction of manufacturer’s profit, compared with the cost of promotional effort borne by manufacturer alone. For retailer, if retailer shares a small proportion of manufacturer’s promotional effort cost, retailer’s profit will increase, whereas retailer’s profits will decrease. Therefore, joint promotion is not an effective strategy when manufacturer invests in promotional effort, joint promotion is an effective strategy when retailer invests in promotional effort and manufacturer shares a small proportion of the cost of retailer’s promotional effort.

关 键 词：零售商主导 联合促销 供应链系统 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]