CEO异质权力对研发投资的影响——基于企业生命周期的调节作用  

The Effect of CEO’s Heterogeneous Power on R&D Investment——Based on the Moderate Role of Firm Life Cycle

作　　者：周建庆 梁彤缨[1] 彭玉莲 陈修德[3] ZHOU Jian-qing;LIANG Tong-ying;PENG Yu-lian;CHEN Xiu-de(School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510641;School of Management,Guangzhou College of South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510800;School of Management,Guangdong University of Technology,Guangzhou 510520)

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广州510641 [2]华南理工大学广州学院管理学院,广州510800 [3]广东工业大学管理学院,广州510520

出　　处：《软科学》2020年第3期111-116,122,共7页Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金面上项目(19BJL068)。

摘　　要：以2009~2017年中国A股制造业上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了CEO异质权力对企业研发投资的差异化影响及其在不同生命周期下所呈现的动态特征。结果发现:(1)从整体上看,结构权力会抑制企业研发投资,所有权权力、专家权力与声望权力对企业研发投资具有促进作用;(2)从不同企业生命周期来看,结构权力的抑制效应仅在衰退期显著存在;所有权权力的促进效应仅在成长期显著存在;专家权力的促进效应同时存在于成熟期和衰退期;声望权力在成长期表现为促进效应,在衰退期则表现为抑制效应。This paper takes Chinese A-share manufacturing listed companies in 2009-2017 as a research object,empirically tests the differential effect of CEO's heterogeneous power on corporate R&D investment and the dynamic characteristics of these effects in different firm life cycle.It finds that:(1)On the whole,CEO’s structure power will inhibit corporate R&D investment,while CEO’s ownership power,expert power and prestige power can promote corporate R&D investment;(2)Based on the firm life cycle,the inhibition effect of structural power exists only in the decline period;the promotion effect of ownership power exists only in the growth period;the promotion effect of expert power exists in both maturity and decline period;the promotion effect of prestige power exists only in the growth period,and it will inhibit R&D investment in the decline period.

关 键 词：CEO异质权力 研发投资 企业生命周期 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理] F272.9[经济管理—国民经济]