企业创新效率研究——来自股权质押的影响  

Efficiency of Corporate Innovation:the Impact of Controlling Shareholders’Stock Pledge

作　　者：姜军[1] 江轩宇 伊志宏[3] JIANG Jun;JIANG Xuanyu;YI Zhihong(Beijing National Accounting Institute;School of Accountancy,Central University of Finance and Economics;School of Business,Renmin University of China)

机构地区：[1]北京国家会计学院,北京101312 [2]中央财经大学会计学院/中国管理会计研究与发展中心,北京100081 [3]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872

出　　处：《金融研究》2020年第2期128-146,共19页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71602197;71872175;71972193);中央财经大学“青年英才”计划(QYP1806);北京工商大学国有资产管理协同创新中心开放课题“工薪所得税筹划与国有企业创新”的资助。

摘　　要：本文结合我国实施创新驱动发展战略及股权质押频繁的现实背景,利用2006—2015年A股上市公司的数据,探讨控股股东的股权质押行为是否以及如何对企业的创新效率产生影响。研究表明,控股股东的股权质押行为会显著降低企业的创新效率。进一步地研究发现:(1)当第二类代理问题越严重,或质押风险越大时,控股股东股权质押行为抑制企业创新效率的作用越明显,表明控股股东股权质押伴随的掏空效应及短视效应,是导致二者负向关系的重要原因;(2)掏空效应和短视效应在影响控股股东股权质押与企业创新效率的关系上存在显著的替代效应;(3)研发投入强度下降时,控股股东股权质押对企业创新效率产生的负面效应更强。本文的研究不仅丰富了企业创新效率影响因素及控股股东股权质押经济后果的相关文献,对于规范控股股东股权质押行为,提高企业创新能力,实现创新驱动发展战略,也具有重要的启示意义。Controlling shareholders in China frequently pledge their stock,and some studies have explored the impact of such stock pledging on corporate innovation inputs and outputs.They find that stock pledging by controlling shareholders can lower the intensity of firm R&D and the amount of patent applications.However,corporate innovation ability is a joint function of innovation efficiency and scale.The literature focuses on the impact of stock pledging on corporate innovation scale while ignoring its effect on innovation efficiency or the dynamic relations between innovation inputs and outputs.Theoretically,there are two competing hypotheses that are potentially related to the impact of controlling shareholders’stock pledging on corporate innovation efficiency.On one hand,such stock pledging may reduce corporate innovation efficiency.First,it increases the deviation of controlling shareholders’control rights and cash flow rights,and it mitigates the monitoring effect of large shareholders,leading managers to engage in more innovative activities.Further,it aggravates the extent of tunneling by controlling shareholders,leading to expropriation of economic resources that could have been used for corporate innovation.Second,due to the risk of control rights transfer arising from stock pledging,it can easily cause controlling shareholders’focus to shift from long-term strategic activity to short-term performance and market capitalization management.As a result,controlling shareholders may ignore innovation activities that play a critical role in establishing companies’long-term competitiveness.The tunneling and myopia effects caused by controlling shareholders’stock pledging may reduce firms’innovation inputs,lead to technological lock-in effects or R&D interruptions,and ultimately reduce corporate innovation efficiency.On the other hand,controlling shareholders’stock pledging may enhance corporate innovation efficiency.Controlling shareholders who pledge stock may prefer higher risk.This kind of shareholder m

关 键 词：企业创新 创新效率 股权质押 控股股东 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]