考虑互惠偏好的闭环供应链系统合作机制研究  

Cooperative Mechanism Study on a Closed Loop Supply Chain System with Reciprocal Preference

作　　者：曾婷婷 李登峰 郑小雪 ZENG Tingting;LI Dengfeng;ZHENG Xiaoxue(School of Economics and Management,Fuzhou University,Fuzhou 350108;School of Management and Economics,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 611731;College of Transportation and Civil Engineering,Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,Fuzhou 350002)

机构地区：[1]福州大学经济与管理学院,福州350108 [2]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都611731 [3]福建农林大学交通与土木工程学院,福州350002

出　　处：《系统科学与数学》2020年第1期41-62,共22页Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(71231003);福建省科技计划项目(2019J05049)资助课题。

摘　　要：将互惠偏好引入到闭环供应链系统合作机制中,研究了由一个制造商,一个零售商和一个再制造商组成的三层闭环供应链,运用Stackelberg博弈理论分析了闭环供应链整体及各成员的最优决策问题,并对5种情形(决策模式)下的均衡结果进行比较分析.研究发现在考虑互惠偏好行为下,分散决策模式和局部联盟决策模式下的系统利润低于集中决策模式下的收益;新产品和再制造产品的销售量(零售价格)与制造商对零售商的互惠偏好系数呈正(负)相关,与零售商对制造商的互惠偏好系数呈负(正)相关;5种决策模式的供应链系统利润与制造商对零售商的互惠偏好系数呈正相关,与零售商对制造商的互惠偏好系数呈负相关.The aim of this paper is to study the cooperative mechanism for a threeechelon closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer,a retailer,and a remanufacture,where the reciprocal preference is taken into consideration.The Stackelberg game theory is used to analyze the optimal decision-making problem of the closedloop supply chain and each member,and compare the equilibrium results across five cooperative and non-cooperative models.The results show that given the reciprocal preference behavior,the system profit under the decentralized and partial-cooperative models are lower than that under the centralized decision model.The sales quantities of new products and remanufactured products(sales price) are positively(negatively)related to the manufacturer’s reciprocal preference coefficient to the retailer,and negatively(positively) related to the retailer’s reciprocal preference coefficient to the manufacturer.The supply chain system profit is positively correlated with the manufacturer’s reciprocal preference coefficient for the retailer,and negatively correlated with the retailer’s reciprocal preference coefficient for the manufacturer.

关 键 词：互惠偏好 闭环供应链 STACKELBERG博弈 利润分配 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]