CEO职业忧虑与企业投资策略中的同业效应  

CEO Career Concern and Peer Effect in Corporate Investment

作　　者：金雪军[1] 肖怿昕 Jin Xuejun;Xiao Yixin(School of Economics,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou 310027,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江大学经济学院,浙江杭州310027

出　　处：《浙江大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2020年第1期97-118,共22页Journal of Zhejiang University:Humanities and Social Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71673249)。

摘　　要：随着行为金融学的发展,企业投资决策之间的相互影响和学习已经成为金融研究的热点问题之一,同业效应对公司投资决策的影响不容忽视。职业忧虑是CEO模仿同业企业投资决策的主要动机之一,探讨其对同业效应的影响机制能够帮助投资者和企业更好地识别和减少管理者的盲目投资。借助主流的三种职业忧虑代理变量研究发现:(1)CEO的职业忧虑主要表现为建立或者维护自己在行业内的声誉,只有为了维护自己在行业内声誉的CEO才倾向于选择跟随同业企业的投资策略。(2)年轻的和新上任的CEO几乎不会选择跟随同业企业的投资策略。(3)CEO在企业过去投资绩效高于行业中位数的情况下倾向于跟随同业企业的投资策略。(4)CEO选择跟随同业企业的投资策略是为了稳定相对投资绩效或者降低决策风险,从而获得连任。With the development of behavior finance,mutual influences and learning among the firms in the same industry has been a research hotspot.It is shown by a fact:the companies’ investment strategies are influenced not only by their financial status,but also by their peers’ investment decisions.Indeed,the impact of peer effect on corporate investment is nonnegligible.Career concern is one of the main motivations of the peer effect.Investigating the influence mechanism of the concern to that peer effect can help investors and companies accurately identify and effectively reduce the managers’ haphazard investment.Moreover,how to measure the career concern is a key point to our research.Based on the three dominant proxy variables for the career concern,we draw four conclusions:Firstly,CEOs who desire to establish reputation in the industry are less likely to follow their peers(mimic their peers’ investment decisions),while those who intend to maintain a great reputation they have owned in the industry are more likely to follow their peers.Secondly,young and newly appointed CEOs prefer personal investment strategies.Thirdly,CEOs are more likely to follow their peers when the firm’s investment performance is worse than the median of the industry.Fourthly,CEOs tend to follow their peers if they could increase the probability to reappointment.According to the rational herding model,most CEOs imitate their peers’ investment decisions to relieve their career concern.In the labor market,CEOs’ rewards and promotions are correlated with their relative performances rather than the absolute performances.Foreign scholars suggest that it is occasional to draw a successful personalized decision while a failure personalized decision will be attributed to the CEO’s ideas.Hence,it is much wiser for CEOs to follow others rather than conducting independently.To compare with it,the structure of CEOs’ rewards is defective and the ratio of performance reward is quite low in Chinese companies,which gives the CEOs no incentiv

关 键 词：同业效应 投资决策 职业忧虑 职位连任 投资绩效 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济] F832.51