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作 者:万赫 钟熙[3] 彭秋萍 Wan He;Zhong Xi;Peng Qiuping(Sun Yat-sen Business School,Guangzhou 510000,China;Huafa Industrial Share Co.,LTD.Zhuhai,Zhuhai 519030,China;School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510640,China)
机构地区:[1]中山大学管理学院,广东广州510000 [2]珠海华发实业股份有限公司,广东珠海519030 [3]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州510640
出 处:《科技进步与对策》2020年第6期119-127,共9页Science & Technology Progress and Policy
基 金:国家自然科学基金项目(71872074,71572202)。
摘 要:控股股东股权质押是中国资本市场中的一种普遍现象,虽然学者们围绕控股股东股权质押对企业创新的影响已经展开了诸多探讨,但鲜有研究关注控股股东股权质押与企业创新方向之间的逻辑关系。以中国2003-2017年A股上市公司为研究对象,从突破式创新和渐进式创新视角,探究控股股东股权质押与企业创新方向之间的逻辑关系,并进一步考察企业股权制衡和企业可视性在其间的调节作用。实证结果显示:控股股东股权质押会抑制企业突破式创新,但不会对企业渐进式创新产生显著影响;随着股权制衡不断增加,控股股东股权质押对企业突破式创新的抑制作用先增强、后削弱,即股权制衡在控股股东股权质押与企业突破式创新之间起着U型调节作用;企业可视性会削弱控股股东股权质押对企业突破式创新的抑制作用。结论有助于更加辩证地认识股权质押的创新后果,对促进企业创新和完善公司治理机制亦具有启示意义。The pledge of controlling shareholder stocks is a common phenomenon in China′s capital market.Scholars have launched many discussions on the impact of controlling shareholder′s stocks pledge on corporate innovation,but still have not reached a consensus conclusion.Taking China's 2003-2017 A share listed companies as the research object,we explores the logical relationship between controlling shareholders′stocks pledge and corporate innovation from the perspective of radical innovation and incremental innovation,and further examines the contextual role of corporate stock counterbalance and corporate visibility.The results show that:Firstly,the controlling shareholder's stocks pledge will inhibit company's radical innovation,but not have a significant impact on the incremental innovation.secondly,with the increase of stock counterbalance,the inhibiting effect of stocks pledge on corporate radical innovation is strengthened first and then weakened,that is,stock counterbalance plays a U-shaped moderate role between controlling shareholder's stocks pledge and corporate radical innovation.Thirdly,corporate visibility will weaken the inhibitory effect of stocks pledge on corporate radical innovation.This study is conducive to dialectically understanding the innovative consequences of stocks pledge,and also has important implications for promoting enterprise innovation and improving corporate governance mechanisms.
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