分析师关注降低上市公司的会计信息风险了吗?--来自中国A股上市公司的经验证据  

Does Analyst Coverage Reduce the Accounting Information Risk of Listed Companies?--Evidence from Chinese Capital Market

作　　者：胡玮佳 韩丽荣[2] Hu Wejia;Han Lirong(School of Accounting,Jjilin University of Finance&Economics,Changchun 130117;Business School,Jjilin University,Changchun 130012)

机构地区：[1]吉林财经大学会计学院,长春130117 [2]吉林大学商学院,长春130012

出　　处：《管理评论》2020年第4期219-230,共12页Management Review

基　　金：吉林财经大学新入职博士科研专项项目(2017B2001)。

摘　　要：作为资本市场的信息中介及外部监督者,分析师在信息传递中扮演着重要角色。本文利用2005-2015年我国A股非金融上市公司数据,对分析师关注能否降低上市公司会计信息风险进行了研究。结果发现,分析师的关注程度与上市公司的盈余管理信息风险和基本面信息风险显著负相关。这表明分析师对上市公司的跟踪活动能够有效识别管理层披露会计信息存在的重大风险。研究结论为分析师在资本市场的外部监督作用提供了经验证据,拓展了识别财务报告中信息风险的相关研究,并强调了资本市场中介机构在市场监管机制中的重要角色。As information intermediaries and external monitors in capital markets,analysts play an important role in information transition. Based on financial data of China’s listed companies from 2005 to 2015,this paper focuses on the research question of whether analyst coverage reduces the risk of accounting information. We find that the risk of earnings management information and fundamental information is negatively associated with financial analyst coverage. This indicates that security analysts’ following behavior can effectively detect the material risk in accounting information. Our results provide empirical evidence on the monitoring effect of analysts. This study not only extends existing researches of detecting risk in financial reporting,but also emphasizes the crucial impacts of intermediaries on capital markets as part of the market monitoring mechanism.

关 键 词：分析师关注 盈余管理 信息风险 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]