偏好、不完全信息与权力博弈——劳动力市场歧视形成机制的比较分析  

Preference,Imperfect Information and Power Game——A Comparative Analysis of the Formation Mechanism of Labor Market Discrimination

作　　者：谢富胜[1,2] 江楠 XIE Fusheng;JIANG Nan(School of Economics,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872;National Research Center for Socialist Political Economy with Chinese Characteristics,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学经济学院,北京100872 [2]中国人民大学全国中国特色社会主义政治经济学研究中心,北京100872

出　　处：《学习与探索》2020年第4期82-89,175,F0002,共10页Study & Exploration

摘　　要：就业歧视是劳动力市场中最受关注的现象之一,对其形成机制的解释在不同经济学体系中存在较大差异。歧视究竟来源于个人偏好带来的非货币成本,还是不完全信息下工人实际能力与观测能力的偏离,理论构建与实验检验都存在较大分歧。然而进步经济学者认为,上述主流理论均仅从市场和个人角度入手,未关注生产过程中的权力博弈关系,实际上,资本积累的需要是歧视产生的内生来源,因此必须从资本控制劳动的角度来剖析歧视生产与再生产的内在机制。本文提出,对歧视形成机制的分析须从马克思主义的视角出发,通过资本主义劳动过程理论来分析劳动力市场歧视的产生根源,从而营造公平的就业制度环境,促进共同富裕。Employment discrimination is one of the most featured phenomena in the labor market,while the explanation for its formation mechanism varies greatly in different economic systems.Whether discrimination comes from the non-monetary cost brought by personal preference or the deviation of workers’actual ability and observation ability under incomplete information,there is a big difference between theoretical construction and experimental testing.However,progressive economists believe that the above-mentioned mainstream theories are only formed from the market and personal perspectives without paying attention to the power game in the production process.In fact,the need for capital accumulation is an endogenous source of discrimination.Therefore,it is necessary to analyze the internal mechanism of discrimination in production and reproduction from the perspective of capital controlling labor.This article proposes that the analysis of the formation mechanism of discrimination must be based on the perspective of Marxism.The capitalist labor process theory is used to analyze the root causes of labor market discrimination,so as to create a fair employment system environment and promote common prosperity.

关 键 词：劳动力市场歧视 个人偏好 不完全信息 权力博弈 资本积累 

分 类 号：F249.2[经济管理—劳动经济]