高管股权激励与大股东掏空抑制研究:大股东异质特征和制度情境的调节效应  

Study on executive stock incentive and major shareholder tunneling restrain:Moderating effect of major shareholder heterogeneity and institutional contexts

作　　者：刘井建[1] 李惠竹 张冬妮 付杰[1] LIU Jingjian;LI Huizhu;ZHANG Dongni;FU Jie(College of Management and Economics,Dalian University of Technology,Dalian 116024,China)

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学经济管理学院,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2020年第3期20-31,共12页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助重大项目(18ZDA095);教育部人文社科规划青年基金资助项目(19YJC790082);辽宁省社科规划基金资助项目(L17BGL016);辽宁省经济社会发展研究课题(2019lslktqn-011);大连理工大学基本科研业务费项目(DUT19RW119)。

摘　　要：在引入合谋薪酬的委托代理模型中,探究高管股权激励对大股东掏空的作用机制,通过数值模拟与规范分析,从收入效应、风险效应以及身份转换效应三个层面阐释高管股权激励对大股东掏空的影响路径,并以我国沪深A股2009年至2013年实施股权激励计划的上市公司为研究对象,运用面板回归分析发现:高管股权激励存在抑制大股东掏空程度的作用;在股权集中度低、控股层级高和两权分离度大,以及市场化程度低、国有性质和集团控股的公司中,高管股权激励对大股东掏空的抑制作用显著,成为有助于投资者保护的内部治理机制;准自然实验的PSM-DID方法稳健性检验也支持了研究假设,并且高管股权激励对大股东掏空在滞后两年的抑制效应显著。研究揭示了高管股权激励对大股东掏空的抑制作用及情境差异,这为从公司内外部治理机制提出抑制大股东掏空的政策提供了启示。As one of the prominent characteristics of emerging capital markets,large shareholder tunneling,represented by capital occupation,debt guarantee,and interest transmission,still exists in large numbers in listed companies in China.How to restrain the tunneling of large shareholders has become an urgent problem to be solved.When large shareholder tunneling reduces the value of the company,executive equity incentives designed to increase the value of the company exacerbate the conflict.Whether this will lead to a change in the role of managers from"collusion"to"gatekeeper"will be an attractive exploration.This paper reveals the interaction between large shareholders and managers using the principal-agent model.After adopting the path of the influence of executive equity incentive on the emptying of large shareholders,panel regression is used to prove the existence of the influence relationship and its channel effect.Using the quasi-natural experiment PSM-DID identification strategy to reduce the endogenous impact,reveal the relationship between executive equity incentive and large shareholder inhibition,this study finds out that conflicts of interest lead to the instability of collusion relationship.First of all,in the principal-agent model of collusive compensation,this paper explores the mechanism of executive equity incentive acting on the emptying of large shareholders.Through numerical simulation and normative analysis,this paper explains the mechanism of executive equity incentive acting on large shareholder tunneling from three aspects:income effect,risk effect,and identity conversion effect.The paper points out that the degree of large shareholder tunneling has been significantly reduced after the implementation of executive equity incentive plan.The higher the proportion of executive ownership is,the lower the degree of tunneling will be.The incentive of executive equity to restrain large shareholder tunneling mainly plays a role in the companies with strong tunneling motivation and favorable tunneling envi

关 键 词：高管股权激励 掏空 大股东异质 准自然实验 

分 类 号：F272.923[经济管理—企业管理]