检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
作 者:黄宗盛[1,2] 冯婷 Huang Zongsheng;Feng Ting(School of Economics&Management,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,China;School of Computer Science,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China)
机构地区:[1]上海海事大学经济管理学院,上海201306 [2]复旦大学计算机科学技术学院,上海200433
出 处:《计算机应用研究》2020年第3期789-793,共5页Application Research of Computers
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71602116);中国博士后基金面上项目(2017M621370)。
摘 要:研究了制造商公平关切下强势零售商的自有品牌导入策略,在有强势零售商存在的供应链中,考虑弱势一方制造商的公平关切对供应链决策的影响。将零售商是否导入自有品牌以及制造商是否具有公平关切行为进行组合,得到了四种情景,分析了四种情景下的供应链博弈模型,得到均衡策略、利润以及相应自有品牌的导入条件;进一步对模型进行比较分析,探讨自有品牌导入以及制造商公平关切对供应链成员决策以及利润的影响。研究发现,制造商的公平关切会使其批发价格和利润提高;零售商导入自有品牌会使零售商和供应链的利润增加,当自有品牌产品替代率较大时也会有利于制造商利润水平的提高。This paper established a Stackelberg game to research the store brand introducing strategy for a powerful retailer in a supply chain which was consisted of a manufacturer and a retailer.As the leader of the supply chain,the retailer chose whether to introduce the store brand,while the manufacturer might have fairness concern towards the channel leader.Firstly,this paper resolved the optimal strategy as well as the profit for both manufacturer and retailer.Secondly,this paper investigated the impact of store brand introducing and fairness concern of the manufacturer by comparing four models.The results show that the manufacturer will raise the wholesale price and also the profit level when considering the fairness concern.The retailer will result in profit increasing with the introducing of store brand.For manufacturers,the store brand does not always harm their interests.The store brand will be also beneficial to the manufacturer on condition that the substitution rate of the store brand is quite large.
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.7