地方政府间税收竞争会诱发过度投资吗  

DOES TAX COMPETITION AMONG LOCAL GOVERNMENTS PROMOTE OVER-INVESTMENT

作　　者：蒲龙 杨高举[2,3] PU Long;Yang Gao-ju(Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics;Zhejiang University)

机构地区：[1]浙江财经大学财政税务学院,310018 [2]浙江大学经济学院 [3]浙江大学财税大数据与政策研究中心

出　　处：《经济理论与经济管理》2020年第4期69-81,共13页Economic Theory and Business Management

基　　金：浙江省软科学项目(2017C35001);区域经济开放与发展研究中心课题(REOD20190611);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金的资助;浙江财经大学现代公共经济学研究中心资助。

摘　　要：政府行为的策略变化是否会引起企业行为的变化?本文以地方政府间税收竞争为切入点,研究其对企业过度投资的影响。本文首先利用工业企业数据库中的制造业企业,测算出企业投资效率并保留其中过度投资的样本;其次利用地级市经济社会数据构造出税收竞争指标,实证检验税收竞争对企业过度投资的影响,并进行相应的异质性分析和稳健性检验。实证研究发现税收竞争显著促进企业过度投资,而且对非国有企业的过度投资行为影响更大。本文的研究结论对当前我国产业结构调整、破解产能过剩等问题有一定的借鉴意义。Will changes in governmental strategy cause changes in corporate behavior? Take the tax competition among local governments as the starting point, this paper discusses the influence of tax competition on enterprises’ overinvestment. Firstly, using the data of manufacturing enterprises and the statistics of prefecture-level cities, we calculate the investment efficiencies of the enterprise and keep the samples with overinvestment for empirical test. Secondly, we construct the tax competition among local governments, analyze its impact on corporate overinvestment, and conduct the corresponding heterogeneityanalysis and robustness test. This paper finds that tax competition will significantly promote the overinvestment of manufacturing enterprises. Further research finds that tax competition has the highest impact on non-state-owned enterprises. The conclusions of this paper have certain reference significance for the current industrial structural adjustment and cracking overcapacity in China.

关 键 词：地方政府 税收竞争 过度投资 制造业企业 

分 类 号：F812.42[经济管理—财政学] F425F406.7