制造商和零售商同时开辟在线渠道下的信息共享价值  

Value of information sharing with online channels opened by both manufacturer and retailer

作　　者：赵静[1] 黄云霞 侯晓瑞 魏丹丹 ZHAO Jing;HUANG Yun-xia;HOU Xiao-rui;WEI Dan-dan(School of Mathematical Sciences,Tiangong University,Tianjin 300387,China)

机构地区：[1]天津工业大学数学科学学院,天津300387

出　　处：《天津工业大学学报》2020年第2期83-88,共6页Journal of Tiangong University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71301116,71371186,71840005)。

摘　　要：考虑制造商和零售商同时开辟在线渠道的双渠道供应链,制造商与零售商各自拥有部分需求预测信息的条件下,为研究信息共享对供应链成员定价策略与最大条件期望利润的影响,分别建立了需求预测信息共享和不共享下制造商主导的Stackelberg博弈定价模型,借助数值算例分析了预测精度对供应链成员最大条件期望利润的影响。结果表明:信息共享对零售商最优在线价和最优零售价的影响相同,对制造商最优售价和零售商最优售价的影响成正比;在一定的参数条件下,信息共享情形下的最优售价大于不共享情形下的最优售价;信息共享是否有利于供应链及成员取决于参数取值。As considering a dual-channel supply chain where both a manufacturer and a retailer open online channels,under the conditions of manafacturers and retailers have their own demand forecast information,two Stackelberg pricing game models dominanted by the manufacturer under information sharing and non-information sharing are established to investigate the influence of information sharing on the optimal pricing strategies and the maximum expected profits of the chain members.The effects of prediction accuracy to the maximum conditional expected profits of the chain members are analyzed in virtue of the numerical examples.The results show that the effect of information sharing on the retailer′s optimal online price is the same as that on the retailer′s optimal retail price,whereas the effect on the manufacturer′s optimal online price is proportional to that on the retailer′s optimal retail price.Under certain parameter conditions,the optimal prices with information sharing are higher than those without information sharing.Whether information sharing is beneficial to the supply chain and its members depends on the parameter values.

关 键 词：双渠道 定价策略 信息共享 STACKELBERG博弈 最大期望利润 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] O224[经济管理—国民经济]