亚里士多德与伦理直觉主义  

Aristotle and Ethical Intuitionism

作　　者：陈海 CHEN Hai(College of Liberal Arts,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444,China)

机构地区：[1]上海大学文学院,上海200444

出　　处：《齐齐哈尔大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2020年第5期36-40,共5页Journal of Qiqihar University(Philosophy & Social Science Edition)

基　　金：2018年国家社科基金青年项目:陆九渊道德直觉主义思想研究(18CZX026)。

摘　　要：亚里士多德从来没有被认为是一名直觉主义者,但他的思想中却包含了许多类似直觉主义的观念,包括他的基础主义立场、对直觉归纳的重视、以及对"接触"的探讨。其中,亚里士多德的"努斯"和"明智"概念是和当代直觉主义研究最为相关的两个概念,前者可以被理解为类似"理性直觉"概念,后者可以被理解为类似"反思平衡"概念。新理性直觉主义通过构建"反思平衡"和"理性直觉"的内在一致性,使得亚里士多德在谈及"努斯"和"明智"的不融贯之处得到消解,构建了亚里士多德与当代伦理学研究的新联系。Aristotle was never been considered as an intuitionist, while his thoughts contained many intuitionism-related notions, including his foundationalism position, emphasis of intuitive induction and investigation of perception. Especially, Aristotle’s concepts of nous and prudence are the two of which most relative to contemporary intuitionism research. Nous could be understood as rational intuition while prudence could be understood as reflective equilibrium. The new rational intuitionism attempts to resolve the incoherence of Aristotle’s discussion of nous and prudence by constructing the coherence of reflective equilibrium and reflective equilibrium,and build the connection between modern ethics and Aristotle.

关 键 词：亚里士多德 努斯 明智 新理性直觉主义 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]