强制性分红:压力下移与盈余管理——基于央企控股上市公司的经验证据  

Mandatory Dividend:Pressure Downshift and Earnings Management——Empirical Evidence from Central Listed Companies in China

作　　者：闫丽娟 何玉润[2] 张嘉硕 Yan Lijuan

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,100872 [2]北京工商大学商学院,100048 [3]河北经贸大学会计学院,050061

出　　处：《会计研究》2020年第2期60-73,共14页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(17BGL049)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：国有资本收益上缴制度是一项强制性分红制度,这种政策带来的强制性分红压力会沿着企业控制层级往下转移.本文实证检验了强制性分红对中央企业盈余管理行为的影响.研究发现,中央企业会通过减少盈余的方式规避该政策带来的压力,尤其是,金子塔层级越低的中央企业这种规避行为越明显.进一步,中央企业面临强制性分红压力与业绩考核压力时,更注重业绩考核的影响.本研究有助于更加全面、准确地评价国有资本收益分配制度的实施效果,为政策优化提供经验证据.The state-owned capital income distribution system is a mandatory dividend system,and the mandatory dividend pressure brought by this policy will shift down along the corporate control level.This paper investigates the impact of the mandatory dividend pressure of state-owned capital income distribution system on the earnings management of the central state-owned companies.We find that the central state-owned enterprises avoid the pressure of mandatory dividends by reducing earnings.In particular,the central state-owned firms with lower pyramidal layers are more likely to avoid the pressure of mandatory dividends by reducing earnings.Further analyses suggested that compared with the mandatory dividend pressure,the central stateowned enterprises pay more attention to the performance appraisal pressure.Our results help to comprehensively and accurately evaluate the impact of the state-owned capital income distribution system and provide empirical evidence for the optimization of the system.

关 键 词：国有资本收益上缴制度 盈余管理 强制性分红压力 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F276.1[经济管理—国民经济]