企业风险承担、所有制与诉讼结案方式  

Corporate Risk-taking,Ownership and Litigation-ending Way

作　　者：苗妙[1] 廖诗雨 MIAO miao;LIAO shiyu(South China University of Technology,Guangzhou,510006)

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学经济与贸易学院

出　　处：《中国经济问题》2020年第2期91-105,共15页China Economic Studies

基　　金：广东省软科学项目(2019A101002004);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(XYMS201905);广州市哲学社会科学规划课题(2019GZQN07)的资助。

摘　　要：本文基于2000-2015年的企业诉讼数据,研究了企业风险承担对企业诉讼结案方式的影响,结果表明企业风险承担越低,企业越倾向于调解;反之,较高的企业风险承担会使企业倾向于选择判决。进一步地,两者关系因企业所有制的不同而产生差异。对国有企业而言,较高的风险承担会增强企业的调解意愿;而非国有企业在较高的风险承担水平下,则倾向于通过判决来维护自身利益。这一发现不仅拓宽了法经济学的研究思路,更重要的是在主张全面调解的背景下,为现行的“大调解”制度赋予了重要的政策含义,有助于企业更快解决纠纷,提高法院结案效率。Based on the corporate litigation data from 2000 to 2015,the article studies the influence of corporate risk-taking on litigation-ending way.The result shows that corporate risk-taking strengthen the litigants'willingness of choosing settlement;on the contrary,higher corporate with higher risk-taking will prefer judgment in the litigation.Furthermore,the relationship varies with corporations'different ownerships.For the state-owned enterprises,higher risk-taking will lead to higher probability of settlement;while for the not-state-owned companies,high-level risk-taking companies tend to insist on judgment to protect their own interests.This finding not only broadens the researches of risk-taking and the economics of law,but also have policy implications under the“Comprehensive Settlement”background.It can help corporations deal with dispute more quickly and improve courts'litigation-ending efficiency.

关 键 词：“大调解”机制 企业风险承担 所有制差异 调解 判决 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理] F121.2[经济管理—国民经济] D926[政治法律—法学]