具公平行为的闭环供应链动态均衡分析  

Dynamic equilibrium Analysis of closed-loop supply chain with Fair behavior

作　　者：张路 马德青 胡劲松[1] ZHANG Lu;MA De-qing;HU Jin-song(School of Business,Qingdao University,Qingdao 266071,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛大学商学院,山东青岛266071

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2020年第6期26-42,共17页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71771129)。

摘　　要：针对的闭环供应链由单个制造商和单个零售商组成,研究两者的公平行为对闭环供应链动态均衡的影响.利用微分博弈理论和贝尔曼连续型动态规划理论分别求解了分散、集中以及成员公平等五种决策模式下的供应链绩效.研究发现:1)产品品牌声誉的提升有利于供应链成员利润的增加.2)零售商具公平行为时有利于零售商利润的增加;制造商具公平行为时,供应链绩效会减小.3)供应链成员均具公平行为会导致产品零售价、回收努力、营销努力均减少.In this paper,a closed-loop supply chain is composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer,and the influence of their fair behavior on the dynamic equilibrium of closed-loop supply chain is studied.Based on the differential game theory and the Berman continuous dynamic programming theory,the supply chain performance in decentralized,centralized and fair decision-making modes is solved respectively.The results are as follows:1)the promotion of product brand reputation is beneficial to the increase of supply chain members’profits.2)the retailer’s fair behavior is beneficial to the increase of retailer’s profit;when the manufacturer has fair behavior,the performance of supply chain will decrease.3)the fair behavior of supply chain members will lead to the decrease of product retail price,recovery effort and marketing effort.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 公平行为 动态均衡 微分博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]