基于势博弈的拥堵收费双层定价模型  

Optimization and Analysis of Congestion Pricing Model Based on Potential Game

作　　者：刘鹏煌 LIU Penghuang(School of Management,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444,China)

机构地区：[1]上海大学管理学院,上海200444

出　　处：《物流科技》2020年第5期109-115,118,共8页Logistics Sci-Tech

摘　　要：文章考虑拥堵收费定价及其不公平性问题,采用双层规划和博弈论结合的方法构建拥堵收费定价模型,考虑到双层规划不易求解,运用势博弈理论证明下层非合作博弈存在Nash均衡,基于博弈方的策略偏差和简单策略偏差将双层规划转化成单层规划,再结合具体的算例分析无收费无补贴、有收费无补贴和有收费有补贴三种情形下各类出行者的出行成本、路网的总出行成本和POA值。结果表明拥堵收费和公交补贴均能有效减少各类出行者的出行成本和路网总出行成本,并提高出行者的出行决策效率,且拥堵收费和公交补贴同时实施效果最佳。Considering congestion pricing and its unfairness,this paper constructs congestion pricing model by using the method of two-level programming and game theory considering that the two-level programming is not easy to solve,the potential game theory is used to prove that there is Nash equilibrium in the non cooperative game in the lower level,and then the two-level programming is transformed into a single-level programming based on the strategic deviation and simple strategic deviation of the players.Finally,combined with specific examples,the paper analyzes the travel cost of the players and the road network under the three situations of no toll no subsidy,no toll subsidy and no toll subsidy.The results show that congestion charge and public transport subsidy can effectively reduce the travel cost of each player and the total travel cost of the road network,and improve the travel decision-making efficiency of travelers,and the best effect is that congestion charge and public transport subsidy are implemented at the same time.

关 键 词：拥堵收费 公交补贴 势博弈 双层规划 

分 类 号：F570[经济管理—产业经济]