考虑技术研发和物流配送的医药供应链组合契约协调模型研究  

Research on the Coordination Model of Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Considering Technology R&D and Logistics Distribution

作　　者：陈晓春 张文松[1] 顾维军 CHEN Xiao-chun;ZHANG Wen-song;GU Wei-jun(School of Economics and Management,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China)

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京100044

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2020年第3期80-92,共13页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2019YJS060);北京市社会科学基金重点资助项目(18GLA008)。

摘　　要：两票制政策的实施使医药供应链管理模式发生了重大变化,也使供应链成员的决策更加复杂。为了确保药品高效、及时、持续的供应,本文研究由一个医药生产企业、一个医药流通企业和一个药店/医院组成的三级供应链的医药定价与协调问题。考虑市场需求受医药生产企业的技术研发和医药流通企业的物流配送影响的情况下,以合作决策的市场价格和最优利润为基准,采用收益共享+数量折扣组合契约作为激励机制,建立了分散决策下供应链组合契约协调模型,探究技术研发和物流配送能力对医药供应链及成员的影响。通过算例分析发现:实施收益共享+数量折扣组合契约策略可以有效的优化和协调医药供应链,能够激励医药生产企业努力提升技术研发水平,激励医药流通企业努力提升物流水平,实现整个医药供应链的帕累托最优。As medical reform policies are implemented and consolidation in pharmaceutical distribution industry accelerates, pharmaceutical supply chain management is constantly upgrading, stiffer competition will improve market concentration. The two-invoice policy breaks the distribution pattern of benefits in the pharmaceutical supply chain. In order to prevent the disconnection of the supply chain due to the instability of supply chain restructuring, a rational pharmaceutical supply chain coordination strategy is explored to give pharmaceutical supply chain and its member appropriate incentives. It is important for improving the efficiency of supply chain management and broadening the profit margins of member companies. The pricing strategy and the coordination of pharmaceutical supply chain under two-invoice policy is investigated. The Stackelberg game model is used to analyze a three-echelon supply chain consisting of one pharmaceutical manufacturer, one pharmaceutical distributor and one retailer pharmacy or hospital. The R & D technology(e1) and logistics capability(e2) are both considered. The relationship between the pharmaceutical manufacturer and distributor are modeled as a Stackelberg game, where the manufacturer is the leader and the distributor is the follower. The manufacturer can employ e1 to improve the effectiveness of drugs. The distributor can employ e2 to improve distribution efficiency of drugs. Market demand is affected by the selling prices(Pr), e1 and e2.By analyzing the optimal pricing decisions and profits in centralized and decentralized systems, the paper puts forward 5 propositions. The optimal selling prices and order quantity are analyzed, and the profits of the supply and its member under both centralized and decentralized decision systems are compared. Then, to improve the performance of the decentralized system, price discount and revenue-sharing contracts combination are proposed to coordinate the supply chain and provide the conditions under which price discount contracts can coordinat

关 键 词：两票制政策 医药供应链 技术研发 物流配送 组合契约模型 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F406[经济管理—国民经济]