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作 者:陈化飞[1] 贾鑫[1] Chen Huafei;Jia Xin(School of Management,Harbin University of Commerce,Harbin 150028,Heilongjiang,China)
机构地区:[1]哈尔滨商业大学管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150028
出 处:《计算机应用与软件》2020年第6期100-107,共8页Computer Applications and Software
基 金:2018年度黑龙江省哲学社会科学研究规划一般项目(18JYB147);2017年度黑龙江省哲学社会科学研究规划项目(17GLB022);哈尔滨商业大学校级科研项目(17XN039)。
摘 要:根据废旧手机在线回收渠道中存在冲突的情形,考虑消费者异质性因素的影响,构建制造商自建回收平台与第三方公共回收平台二者之间竞争回收以及合作回收两种博弈模型。通过比较发现,不同的线上回收策略受消费者异质性的影响。研究表明:只有当渠道偏好系数、价格偏好系数以及两条渠道的单位回收收益满足一定条件时,双方合作才能使供应链利润增加,否则一方盈利水平过高将会导致市场形成垄断,不利于两个平台的合作。运用数值算例的方法对结论进行了验证和延伸分析,在验证结论有效性的同时,以期为企业的回收决策提供理论帮助。According to the conflicts in the online recycling channels of used mobile phones,taking into account the influence of consumer heterogeneous factors,we build two game models of competition recovery and cooperative recovery between the manufacturer s self-built recycling platform and the third-party public recycling platform.Through comparison,it is found that different online recycling strategies are affected by consumers heterogeneity.The research shows that only when the channel preference coefficient,the price preference coefficient and the unit recycling income of the two channels meet certain conditions,the cooperation between the two parties can increase the profit of the supply chain.Otherwise,the high profit level of one party will lead to the market monopoly,which is not conducive to cooperation between the two platforms.The numerical example is used to verify and extend the analysis.Meanwhile,verifying the validity of the conclusion,it is expected to provide theoretical help for the recycling decision of enterprises.
关 键 词:互联网+ 废旧手机回收 消费者异质性 STACKELBERG博弈
分 类 号:TP3[自动化与计算机技术—计算机科学与技术] F272[经济管理—企业管理]
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