基于多任务委托代理模型招聘专员激励问题的分析--以A公司为例  

An analysis of the incentive problem of recruiting specialists based on multi task principal-agent model-Taking company A as an example

作　　者：李佳雷 严广乐[1] LI Jialei;YAN Guangle(Business School,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China)

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《智能计算机与应用》2020年第3期119-123,127,共6页Intelligent Computer and Applications

基　　金：上海高原学科建设项目(10-17-303-004)。

摘　　要：为了研究如何激励招聘专员努力提高企业对人才招聘的有效性,本文以A公司为例进行分析,并假设该公司的招聘专员主要包含2项任务:通过筛选简历、面试、交谈获得应聘者的直接信息和通过电话、邮件、委托机构等方式对应聘者的背景进行调查获得间接信息。由于间接信息获取比较困难,招聘专员会利用信息优势隐匿真实的努力水平,存在损害企业利益的道德风险,降低招聘的有效性。为了使招聘专员在2项任务上能够合理地分配努力程度,本文构建了多任务委托-代理模型。分析表明,招聘专员所承担任务被观测的难易程度及任务之间努力成本的相互关系对激励强度系数有着重要的影响。为防企业对招聘专员激励效能的弱化,文章最后提出相应的制度设计。In order to study how to motivate recruitment specialists to improve the effectiveness of enterprise recruitment,this paper takes company A as an example to analyze,and assumes that the recruitment specialists of the company mainly include two tasks:obtaining the direct information of the candidates through screening resumes,interviews and conversations,and obtaining the indirect information through surveys on the background of the candidates through telephone,email,and entrustment agencies.Due to the difficulty of obtaining indirect information,recruitment specialists will use the information advantage to hide the true level of effort,which will damage the interests of enterprises and reduce the effectiveness of recruitment.In order to make the recruiters distribute their efforts reasonably in two tasks,this paper constructs a multi task principal-agent model.The analysis shows that the difficulty of the task being observed and the relationship between the efforts cost of the task have an important influence on the incentive intensity coefficient.In order to prevent the weakening of the incentive effectiveness of recruiters,the paper finally puts forward the corresponding system design.

关 键 词：招聘专员 有效招聘 多任务委托代理模型 背景调查 激励机制设计 

分 类 号：F244.3[经济管理—劳动经济]