露天矿山奖惩策略有效性的仿真研究  

Simulation Research on Effectiveness of Reward and Punishment Strategy in Open-pit Mines

作　　者：聂兴信[1] 白存瑞 Nie Xingxin;Bai Cunrui(School of Resources Engineering,Xi’an University of Architectural Science and Technology,Xi’an 710055,China;School of Management,Xi’an University of Architectural Science and Technology,Xi’an 710055,China)

机构地区：[1]西安建筑科技大学资源工程学院,陕西西安710055 [2]西安建筑科技大学管理学院,陕西西安710055

出　　处：《系统仿真学报》2020年第5期946-955,共10页Journal of System Simulation

基　　金：陕西省自然科学基金(2016JM5088)。

摘　　要：矿山安全事故屡有发生,矿工有意不安全行为(Intentional Unsafe Behavior,IUB)是主要致因因素之一,实施奖惩策略是矿山企业的主要应对策略。为了明确奖惩策略对矿工IUB的作用机理及其约束效力,基于行为经济学+IUB扩散规则,结合多智能体(Agent)模型分析矿工发生IUB的影响因素,并基于工作情景适应度函数和不安全行为适应性函数构建了仿真模型,在Netlogo平台中进行比对分析,探索总结发生IUB的宏观涌现规律,利用工作情景适应度状态值记录不同属性矿工行为选择的具体情况。Mining safety accidents occur frequently, and one of the main causes is the miners’ Intentional Unsafe Behavior(IUB), and therefore implementing the reward and punishment strategy on it is the key coping strategy. In order to study how the reward and punishment strategy acts on the Intentional Unsafe Behavior(IUB) of the miners and how effective the strategy is, based on the Behavioral Economics + IUB Diffusion Theory, combined with the Multi-Agent model to analyze the influencing factors of the miners’ IUB, and based on the work situation adaptability function and the unsafe behavior adaptability function, the simulation model is created. The study explores and summarizes the macroscopic emergence rule of IUB by the comparison and analysis in the Netlogo platform, and records the behavior selection of each attribute operator by using the work situation adaptability status value.

关 键 词：不安全行为 工作情景适应度 建模仿真 奖惩策略 NETLOGO 

分 类 号：TP391.9[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]