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作 者:郑志刚[1] ZHENG Zhigang(School of Finance,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)
出 处:《金融评论》2020年第1期34-47,124,共15页Chinese Review of Financial Studies
摘 要:作为当下公司治理领域思潮争论中代表"左"和"右"的两极,无论商业圆桌会议宣扬的利益相关者主义,还是反对双重股权结构实践的股权至上主义,在强调对控制权占有上表现出高度的一致性。本文一方面在回顾利益相关者主义兴起、发展和历史归宿基础上,论证利益相关者主义所面临的实施困难,进而讨论为什么股东中心的地位不可撼动;另一方面,在简单回顾同股不同权构架发展历史的基础上,论证投票权配置权重向创业团队倾斜的合理性,强调"同股不同权"构架并不是对股东中心的简单反对,而是基于外部治理环境的变化所进行的理性扬弃。公司治理一方面需要保障提升效率的专业化分工的持续深化,另一方面则需要使处于信息弱势的中小股东的权益得到保护。因此,公司治理的正确理念是,追求如何在专业化分工带来效率改善与缓解代理冲突降低代理成本二者之间进行平衡,而并非利益相关主义和股权至上主义所强调的简单的"控制权占有"。As the two poles of"left"and"right"in the current ideological are debating in the field of corporate governance,no matter the Stakeholder Doctrine advocated by the Business Roundtable or the Shareholder Supremacy against the practice of dual equity structure,it shows a high degree of consistency in emphasizing the possession of control rights.On the one hand,based on the review of the rise,development,and historical destination of stakeholder doctrine,this paper demonstrates the implementation difficulties faced by stakeholder doctrine,and then discusses why the status of shareholder center cannot be shaken;on the other hand,on the basis of simply reviewing the development history of"different rights of same shares"structure,this paper demonstrates the rationality of the weight of voting right allocation inclining to entrepreneurial teams,emphasizing that"different rights of same shares"structure is not a simple objection to shareholder center,but a rational development based on the change of external governance environment.Corporate governance not only needs to ensure the continuous deepening of specialization which can improve efficiency but also to protect the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders who are vulnerable to information.Therefore,the correct concept of corporate governance is to seek a balance between the improvement of efficiency brought by specialization and the alleviation of agency conflicts and the reduction of agency costs,rather than the simple"control possession"emphasized by stakeholder doctrine and shareholder supremacy.
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