风险规避下师徒间隐性知识共享激励机制  

Incentive Mechanism of Tacit Knowledge Sharing between Mentors and Apprentices under Risk Aversion

作　　者：宋寒[1] 王越[1] 代应[1] Song Han;Wang Yue;Dai Ying(School of Management,Chongqing Ligong University,Chongqing 400054,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆理工大学管理学院,重庆400054

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2020年第11期120-127,共8页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“知识密集型服务外包中的知识共享激励与知识资产争端协调机制研究”(71301182);“新一代信息技术产业‘联盟组合’与创新能力研究:涌现、构型与治理”(71572028)。

摘　　要：针对师徒隐性知识共享激励机制设计问题,建立多任务委托代理模型,分析师徒风险规避度对组织收益、激励系数以及师徒努力程度的影响。研究表明,组织制定对师徒最优激励系数仅与其各自风险规避度负相关,而组织收益与师徒双方风险规避度均为负相关。进一步比较师傅完成自身工作和共享工作的努力程度表明,当师徒产出系数比大于上阀值时,师傅会更加关注自身工作,当产出系数比小于下阀值时,师傅会更加关注对徒弟的知识共享帮助,而当产出系数比位于上下阀值之间时,具备较低风险规避度的师傅才会更加努力帮助徒弟完成共享工作。Aiming at the design problem of tacit knowledge sharing incentive mechanism between mentors and apprentices,a multi-task principal—agent model is established.The model analyzes the influences of the risk aversion of both mentors and apprentices on the incentive contract coefficient and the income of the organization,and the efforts that both parties made.The research shows that the optimal incentive coefficient of the organization to the master and apprentice is negatively related to the risk aversion degree of each other,but the organizational income is negatively related to the risk aversion degree of both teachers and apprentices.The further in—depth comparison of the master's efforts in completing his own work and knowledge sharing with apprentices shows that when the ratio of the master—apprentice output coefficient is greater than the upper threshold,the master pays more attention to his own work;when the ratio is less than the lower threshold,the master pays more attention to the knowledge sharing with his apprentices;when the master—apprentice output coefficient is between the upper and lower thresholds,masters with lower risk avoidance will work harder to complete the sharing work.

关 键 词：隐性知识共享 师徒制 激励机制 风险规避 

分 类 号：C933.1[经济管理—管理学] F272