基于信任的供应预测信息共享策略  

The Strategy of Trust-based Supply Forecast Information Sharing

作　　者：张玉华[1] 戴更新[1] 孙浩[1] 韩广华[2] 王磊[1] ZHANG Yu-hua;DAI Geng-xin;SUN Hao;HAN Guang-hua;WANG Lei(School of Business,Qingdao University,Qingdao 266071,China;School of International and Public Affairs,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛大学商学院,山东青岛266071 [2]上海交通大学国际与公共事务学院,上海200030

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2020年第5期112-121,共10页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71501128);山东省自然科学基金资助项目(ZR2017MG015,ZR2015GM001);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(17YJC630130);上海交通大学文理交叉基金资助项目(15JCZY05);青岛市博士后应用研究项目(2015173)。

摘　　要：现实中供应不确定是比较普遍的现象,供应预测信息共享对改善供应链绩效起着重要作用。针对由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的单周期供应链,利用斯坦克尔伯格博弈方法研究信任对供应预测信息共享的影响以及回购契约对该供应链的协调作用。研究表明:零售商对制造商的信任影响供应预测信息共享效果,进而影响供应链绩效;制造商说谎的心理负效用系数越大,越倾向于说真话;回购契约可以促进制造商共享真实供应预测信息;当制造商说谎的心理负效用系数较大时,存在一个最佳的回购价格,使供应链实现完美协调。Information sharing has always been a hot issue in supply chain management research.Most of the literature focuses on demand forecast information sharing,assuming that the supply is deterministic.However supply uncertainty is a common phenomenon in reality and supply forecast information sharing also plays an important role in improving supply chain performance.The literature on supply forecast sharing assumes that the recipient of the information either absolutely trusts in the sender of the message or not at all.?zer et al.(2011)confirmed through behavioral experiments that both parties trust each other to a certain extent according to their own judgments.Therefore,the supply forecast sharing strategy of supply chain members is studied from the perspective of trust.In order to explore the impact of trust on supply forecast information sharing and supply chain coordination,the operation of supply chain in centralized decision-making is analyzed.Secondly,the Stackelberg game is used to analyze the cases that the retailer absolutely trusts,completely distrusts,and partially trusts in the manufacturer.Finally,the operation of supply chain where the retailer trusts in the manufacturer to some extent is analyzed and the buyback contract is used to coordinate the supply chain.The results show that:the trust of retailers in manufacturer affects the performance of supply chain;the larger the psychological negative utility coefficient of manufacturer’s lying,the more the manufacturer inclines to tell the truth;the buy back contract can promote the manufacturer to share the supply information truthfully;when the psychological negative utility coefficient of manufacturer’s lying is larger,there exists an optimal buy back price which can achieve the supply chain coordination.

关 键 词：供应链 信任 信息共享 供应预测信息 供应链协调 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]