莲花戒中观哲学中的几个关键问题  

Some Key Questions in Kamalaśīla’s Philosophy

作　　者：桑旦东知 bSam gtan don grub(Ethnic Publishing House)

机构地区：[1]民族出版社

出　　处：《中国藏学（藏文版）》2019年第4期102-113,共12页CHINA TIBETOLOGY

摘　　要：文章考察了莲花戒《中观光明论》中“无自性性”和“二谛”的内涵与特点,分析、梳理了莲花戒在该论著中用教与理驳斥实有论者、中观应成派及他宗数论派承许内外法实有之观点,阐释其内外一切法在究竟意义上无自性性,但于名言上却能安立自相的哲学观点。从莲花戒的这一观点可知,其一,他传承了中观派共许一切法无自性性的观点;其二,在世俗与名言上承许法之自相,故而划清了与中观应承派在这一基本哲学观点上的界线。文章指出在“二谛”概念上,莲花戒将是否有碍观见真实义之理智量作为其标准,通过构建世俗上有而破断见,于究竟上空而破常见的调和二谛之理论框架,定义了其“中道观”。This paper based on Kamalaśīla’s Madhyamakāloka,aims to investigate the contents and characteristics of“Niḥsvabhāvatā”and“Satyadvaya”in his philosophy system of Madhyamakā,points out Kamalaśīla refuted other schools(especially Yogācāra,Sāṃkhya,Prāsaṅgik)and illustrates that all dharma is“devoid of own being”(nihsvabhava)but being in the meaning of Saṃvṛtisatyam.In this way,he not only acknowledged all things were nihsvabhava but also distinguished between Yogācāra-Madhyamaka and Prāsaṅgika’s viewpoints at all things being in the meaning of Saṃvṛtisatyam.Moreover,he analyzed inevitable concepts like Satyadvaya,concluded that these concepts support“devoid of own being(nihsvabhava)”.

关 键 词：莲花戒 《中观光明论》 无自性性 二谛 中道观 

分 类 号：B946.6[哲学宗教—宗教学]