股票期权激励异质价值与高管风险承担  

Heterogeneous Value of Stock Option Incentive and Executives’ Risk-taking

作　　者：屠立鹤 孙世敏[1] TU Lihe;SUN Shimin(School of Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110167,China;School of Economics Management and Statistics,University of Bologna,Bologna 40126,Italy)

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,沈阳110167 [2]博洛尼亚大学经济管理与统计学院,博洛尼亚40126

出　　处：《管理科学》2020年第1期137-153,共17页Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(17BGL244);国家自然科学基金(71271048);教育部人文社会科学基金(16YJA630048)。

摘　　要：目前围绕股票期权激励对高管风险承担影响的研究结论不一。经典代理理论基于代理人风险规避假设,认为授予高管股票期权越多,收入就越具凸性,其风险承担水平也就越高;而行为代理理论突破这一假设后却认为,高管对股票期权产生心理禀赋,其风险承担水平并不随着股票期权授予的增加而提高。将股票期权激励区分为预期价值和禀赋价值两种异质价值,运用P-P法和F-L法两种测量高管风险承担水平的方法,以2006年至2016年中国沪深上市公司为分析样本,采用面板数据固定效应模型研究股票期权激励两种异质价值分别与高管风险承担的关系;在此基础上,进一步考察股票期权激励异质价值对不同产业下高管风险承担方向的影响,并借鉴HOVAKIMIAN et al.的研究思想构建最优风险承担估计模型,探讨股票期权激励是否导致高管过度风险承担的问题。研究结果表明,①股票期权激励预期价值与高管风险承担呈显著正相关关系,股票期权激励禀赋价值与高管风险承担呈显著负相关关系。②货币薪酬强化了股票期权激励预期价值与高管风险承担的正相关关系,弱化了股票期权激励禀赋价值与高管风险承担的负相关关系;任职危机弱化了股票期权激励预期价值与高管风险承担的正相关关系,也弱化了股票期权激励禀赋价值与高管风险承担的负相关关系;但在职消费对上述关系的影响并不明显。③股票期权激励异质价值对不同产业类型高管风险承担影响的方向有所不同,在高科产业中,主要影响高管研发投入和经营集中度方面的风险承担;在传统产业中,主要影响研发投入和杠杆水平方面的风险承担。另外,高管对股票期权激励预期价值的追逐导致其过度风险承担。研究结果对经典代理理论与行为代理理论的分歧给予了一个新的解释。建议公司在制定高管股票期权激励计划�Current research finding for the impact of stock option incentive on executives’risk-taking are different.Based on the hypothesis of agent risk aversion,classical agency theory points out that the more stock options are granted to executives,the more convex their salary will be,and then the higher level of their risk-taking will be;however,Behavioral Agency Theory breaks through this hypothesis,and points out that executives will have psychological endowment on stock options,and the level of their risk-taking doesn’t increase with the increase of stock options.Based on the integration of classical agency theory and behavioral agency theory,this study divides the stock option incentive into two heterogeneous values,namely,prospective value and endowment value,and uses two methods of P-P and F-L to measure the level of executives’risk taking to analyze the influence of the heterogeneous values(prospective value and endowment value)on the executive risk-taking of the above two kinds.This study also researches the moderating effects of salary compensation,perks and post crisis on the relationship between values of stock option incentive and executives’risk-taking.Further,this study researches the influence of heterogeneous value of stock option incentive on the direction of executives’risk-taking in different industries,and whether the pursuit of prospective value leads to executives’excessive risk-taking behavior.This study chooses 478 companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange which implement the stock option incentive plan from January 1,2006 to December 31,2016.The main conclusions of this study are as follows:①There is a significant positive(negative)correlation between the prospective value(endowment value)of the stock option incentive and executives’risk-taking;②Salary compensation strengthens the positive correlation between the prospective value of stock option incentive and executives’risk-taking,also weakens the negative correlation between the endowment value of stock option inc

关 键 词：股票期权 异质价值 预期价值 禀赋价值 风险承担 

分 类 号：F272.923[经济管理—企业管理]