分析师期望落差、CEO权力与企业研发支出--基于内外治理机制的二次调节作用  

Analyst Expectation Deficit,CEO Power and R&D Expenditure--Based on the Second Moderating Effects of Internal andExternal Governance Mechanisms

作　　者：陈伟宏[1,2] 钟熙[1,2] 蓝海林[1,2] 周荷晖 CHEN Wei-hong;ZHONG Xi;LAN Hai-lin;ZHOU He-hui(School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510640,China;Research Center of Chinese Corporate Strategic Management,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510640,China)

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广州510640 [2]华南理工大学中国企业战略管理研究中心,广州510640

出　　处：《研究与发展管理》2020年第2期1-10,共10页R&D Management

基　　金：教育部重大攻关项目“中国制造业转型升级战略研究”(15JZD020);国家社会科学基金重点项目“转型升级制度压力下优势制造企业战略反应与政策”(15AGL003);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“中国制造企业转型升级动力机制研究”(17YJA630006)。

摘　　要：基于委托代理理论,以2007-2017年中国民营制造业企业为研究对象,本文着重探究了分析师期望落差与企业研发支出之间的逻辑关系。结果表明:分析师期望落差所引致的绩效压力将驱使管理者削减研发支出,即分析师期望落差对企业研发支出具有显著的负向影响;随着CEO权力的提高,分析师期望落差对企业研发支出的负向影响将增强;随着董事会监督与分析师关注度的提高,CEO权力对分析师期望落差与企业研发支出之间负向关系的增强效应将被削弱。本文拓展了既有文献对资本市场如何影响企业研发决策的理解,同时也丰富了公司治理方面的研究成果。Based on principal-agent theory,it took the Chinese private manufacturing enterprises from 2007 to 2017 as study objects,and investigated the logical relationship between analyst expectation deficit and R&D expenditure.The results show:the performance pressure incurred by analyst expectation deficit drives managers to reduce R&D expenditure,that is to say,analyst expectation deficit has a significantly negative impact on R&D expenditure. As the extent of CEO power increases,the negative impact of analyst expectation deficit on R&D expenditure is enhanced.With the increase of board monitoring and analyst coverage attention,the enhancement effect of CEO power on the negative relationship between analyst expectation deficit and R&D expenditure is weakened. It expands the understanding on how capital market influences R&D decisions,and enriches the research achievements of corporate governance.

关 键 词：分析师期望落差 研发支出 CEO权力 董事会监督 分析师关注度 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]