企业并购重组中共有审计师与并购业绩承诺  被引量:16

The Shared Auditors in M&A Transactions and M&A Performance Commitment

在线阅读下载全文

作  者:武恒光[1] 马丽伟 李济博 Wu Hengguang;Ma Liwei;Li Jibo

机构地区:[1]山东财经大学会计学院,250014 [2]中国财政科学研究院

出  处:《审计研究》2020年第3期95-104,共10页Auditing Research

基  金:教育部人文社会科学研究项目(项目批准号:16YJC790110);山东省自然科学基金项目(项目批准号:ZR2016GM17);山东省教育厅教学改革项目(项目批准号:Z2016Z037);2019年省级研究生教育优质课程(内部控制理论)的阶段性成果。

摘  要:共有审计师与业绩承诺分别作为并购重组中的非正式契约与正式缔结契约,均客观上构成推动并购重组完成的重要制度安排。本文基于信息不对称视角,探讨共有审计师对业绩承诺的影响机制。结果显示,共有审计师显著降低了并购业绩承诺的应用概率,增强了业绩承诺可靠性;共有审计师影响业绩承诺的机制是,在信息不对称程度高的场景中发挥信息不对称降低功能及强化支付方式、业绩承诺契约安排对承诺可靠性的促进效应。进一步分析发现,共有审计师能够降低并购前并购双方的财务信息错报风险、抑制并购当年新增商誉带来的后续商誉减值,在主并方正式制度功能不足时发挥更强的业绩承诺可靠性促进效应。本研究拓展了共有审计师经济后果的研究视角,丰富了业绩承诺影响因素的研究,为监管机构及投资者评价业绩承诺的相关制度安排提供了增量证据。Shared auditors as informal contract and performance commitment as formal contract in M&A transactions both constitutes important institutional arrangements to promote the completion of M&A.This paper examines the impact of shared auditors in M&A transactions on performance commitment from the perspective of information asymmetry.It is found that shared auditors are associated with significantly lower possibility of acquirer application of performance commitment,and higher reliability of performance commitment.Shared auditors have an impact on M&A performance commitment by reducing information asymmetry for deals with greater uncertainty,and facilitating the commitment reliability of contractual arrangements including payment method and performance commitment.This paper further finds that shared auditors can reduce pre-acquisition financial misstatement risk of the acquirer and the target,alleviate the goodwill impairment of new M&A goodwill,and that it is more pronounced for transactions where the acuqirer has low internal control quality.Our findings expand the literature on shared auditors economic outcomes and factors affecting performance commitment.It may also provide evidence for regulators and investors to assess relevant performance commitment arrangements.

关 键 词:并购重组 共有审计师 并购业绩承诺 

分 类 号:F271[经济管理—企业管理] F239.4[经济管理—国民经济]

 

参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

耦合文献:

正在载入数据...

 

引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

同被引文献:

正在载入数据...

 

相关期刊文献:

正在载入数据...

相关的主题
相关的作者对象
相关的机构对象